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Synthesis of Louisiana Law on Spoliation of




Spoliation of evidence is "the destruction or the significant and meaningful
alteration of a document or instrument."1 It is a dreaded situation where a
critical piece of evidence is found to be missing, either as the result of an
intentional act or through someone's negligence. This most commonly occurs
in products liability cases' and medical malpractice cases,' although it can occur
in any civil matter.4 Many courts have held that a plaintiff who alleges such
destruction of evidence has stated a cause of action for interference with a civil
lawsuit by spoliation of evidence.$ As stated in La Raia v. Superior Court,
one does not state a claim for physical injuries due to the spoliation of evidence,
but rather for "damage done to [the] lawsuit by destruction of the evidence."6
Copyright 1998, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Maria Losavio is an associate at the law firm of Fuhrer, Flouroy, Hunter & Morton in
Alexandria, LA. She is a 1996 graduate of LSU Law School where she was a member of the LSU
Law Review, 1994-96.
My heart-felt thanks to my husband and children who supported me from the inception of this
paper through the time of its publication and the many drafts in between.
I. Black's Law Dictionary 1401 (6th ed. 1990).
2. See. e.g., Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 24 (Fla. Disl Ct. App. 1990); Bums v.
Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Murray v. Farmers Ins. Co., 796 P.2d
101 (Idaho 1990). See also John Kuppens, There Is No Substitute:. Spoliation of Evidence in
Products Liability Suits, 5 S.C. Law. 28 (March/April 1994).
3. See, e.g., DeLaughter v. Lawrence County Hosp., 601 So. 2d 818 (Miss. 1992) (involving
lost medical records); Pharr v. Cortese, 559 N.Y.S. 2d 780 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (involving falsified
medical records); Brewer v. Dowling, 862 S.W.2d 156 (Tea. App. 1993) (involving lost fetal monitor
strips). See also Thomas Fisher, Medical Malpractice: Presumption or Inference From Failure of
Hospital or Doctor to Produce Relevant Medical Records, 69 A.L.R.4th 906 (1989).
4. See. e.g., Vick v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 514 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1975) (involving
an unemployment compensation claim); General Envtl. Science Corp. v. Horsfall, 141 F.R.D. 443
(N.D. Ohio 1992) (involving a trade secret suit); Capelluo v. FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545 (D. Minn.
1989) (involving an employment discrimination action); Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 116
F.R.D. 107 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (involving a complex antitrust litigation); Petrik v. Monarch. Printing
Corp., 501 N.E.2d 1312 (i1. App. Ct. 1986) (involving a retaliatory discharge suit).
5. E.g., La Raia v. Superior Court, 722 P.2d 286,289 (Ariz. 1986); Temple Community Hosp.
v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 57, 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) and Cedars-Sinai Med. Cir. v.
Superior Court, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 831, 835 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that "the interest interfered
with ... is the possibility of winning a law suit").
6. 722 P.2d 286, 289 (Ariz. 1986). See also Temple Community Hosp., SI Cal. Rptr. 2d at
61 and Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 50 Cal. Rptr. at 835 (stating that "the interest interfered with... is
the possibility of winning a law suit"); Augusta v. United Serv. Auto. Assoc., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 400
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The spoliation-of-evidence claim may be brought under tort law or contract
law.'
Spoliation of evidence is a growing concern throughout Louisiana and the
nation. This comment is designed to be a brief introduction to the history of
spoliation of evidence, so that a more thorough analysis of recent cases may be
addressed. 8 This comment will explore this developing area of the law by
discussing how other jurisdictions have handled it and by comparing those
approaches to Louisiana jurisprudence. The numerous factors courts have
considered in deciding whether to recognize the new tort? will be analyzed to
demonstrate why some jurisdictions, including Louisiana, have been reluctant to
adoptspoliation of evidence as a separate tort. Once the cause of action is
recognized, various procedural hurdles, including statutes of limitation, must be
overcome. These procedural issues are also discussed. Finally, this comment
will explore other remedies and sanctions as an alternative to recognition of a
new tort. The ineffectiveness and inadequacies of such alternative remedies will
be discussed throughout the comment, which necessitates in this writer's opinion,
the recognition of spoliation of evidence as a separate tort.
II. OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A. History/Development of Spoliation of Evidence as a New Tort
1. Intentional Spoliation of Evidence
One of the first cases to discuss the destruction of evidence was Armory v.
Delamirie.10 Armory is an early English bailment case in which a piece of
jewelry was deposited with a jeweler for appraisal. The jeweler had failed to
return the jewel to the plaintiff, and since there was no appraisal of its worth, he
was unable to prove damages. The court instructed the jury that there was a
strong presumption against the jeweler, which allowed the highest award for the
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a spoliation-of-evidence cause of action is based upon injury to
plaintiffs property interests, not personal injury).
7. See, e.g., Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
a contractual duty existed to preserve the evidence and that a breach of the contract was sufficient
to bring a spoliation-of-evidence claim). See also the companion case of Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
650 So. 2d 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
8. The scope of this comment will be limited to spoliation of civil evidence, although there
will be some reference to approaches taken in criminal cases for purposes of analogy, as well as
some guidance from criminal code sanctions. This comment will not discuss court-ordered
destructive testing procedures; however, some of the cases examined in the comment involve
destructive testing (without a court order) by a party to the suit or by an expert witness.
9. Those critical factors include: (I) intentional versus negligent spoliation, (2) duty to
preserve the evidence, (3) availability of alternative remedies, (4) prejudicial injury, and (5) spoliation
by a party to the original lawsuit versus by a third party.
10. 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722).
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possible value of the jewel." The court in Armory did not recognize a new
tort; however, it was willing to impose remedies for the wrong that had
occurred-spoliation of evidence. For several decades, such an adverse
presumption was one of the only methods the courts utilized to combat the
destruction or alteration of evidence in civil litigation.
In 1984, the era of intentional spoliation of evidence truly began. In Smith
v. Superior Court, a California court recognized the tort of intentional spoliation
of evidence for the first time." In Smith, a foreign object flew off a preceding
vehicle and crashed into plaintiff's van as she was driving. Thereafter, plaintiff's
van was towed to the dealer for repair where the dealer agreed with plaintiff's
counsel to preserve the van parts for physical evidence while further investigation
took place. Some time later, however, the dealer lost or destroyed the evidence,
which prohibited the plaintiff's expert from examining it.'3 Under the facts, the
court felt it was appropriate to recognize the new tort of intentional spoliation
of evidence since the spoliator was a third party, and any sanction would be
futile. 4 In doing so, the court discussed criminal and other sanctions which
might be imposed, finding each a minimal deterrence where the third party
intentionally destroyed evidence and thereby stood to gain substantially by that
destruction. The court also considered the devastating effect spoliation of
evidence has to the opposing party.'
Smith was followed in 1986 when Alaska recognized the tort of intentional
spoliation of evidence in Hazen v. Municipality ofAnchorage.'6 Hazen involved
a taped recording between plaintiff and an undercover police officer. The
municipal prosecutor in the case promised to preserve the tape in anticipation of
a possible civil lawsuit. Later it was discovered that the tape had been tampered
with, making critical parts of it inaudible. 7 Thus, the court found that a cause
of action in tort existed against the city and the prosecutor for "intentional
interference with a prospective civil action by spoliation of evidence."'"
Since these two threshold cases, courts across the country have been forced
to decide whether to recognize the tort. Although it has been a piecemeal
process, the cause of action has been recognized in several states as a new tort.
Thus far, the following states have specifically recognized the separate tort
of intentional spoliation of evidence: California, 9 Alaska,2° Ohio,2
11. Id.
12. 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. CL App. 1984).
13. Id. at 831.
14. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
15. Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 834-35.
16. 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986).
17. Id. at 458-59.
18. Id. at 463.
19. Smith v. Superior Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
20. Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986).
21. Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E. 2d 1037 (Ohio 1993) and reaffirmed by the court
in Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 635 N.E.2d 331 (Ohio 1994).
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Indiana, 2  Kansas, 3 Florida, 4 and New Mexico." The Texas appellate
courts are split on this issue. One appellate court in Texas recognized the claim
as a new cause of action in Ortega v. Trevino;26 however, see Malone v.
Foster,2" holding that Texas does not recognize the tort of spoliation of
evidence and criticizing Ortega. The Texas Supreme Court has not had the issue
before it to decide the fate of this claim in Texas.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hospital of Decatur,
recognized "an implied statutory cause of action for spoliation of evidence"
where a hospital failed to maintain x-rays in violation of that state's X-Ray
Retention Act." Although not called "spoliation of evidence," Michigan
recognized the tort of "interference with economic relations" in Jackovich v.
General Adjustment Bureau, Inc.,29 and New Jersey recognized the tort of
"intentional concealment of evidence" in Viviano v. CBS." Both of these torts
deal with the destruction of evidence. There are also several states which have
inferred that, should the right case come before the courts, they would recognize
it.31 Only two states have expressly refused to recognize intentional spoliation
of evidence as an independent tort.3 2 Most states have allowed a jury instruc-
22. Levinson v. The Citizens Nat'l Bank of Evansville, 644 N.E.2d 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
23. Foster v. Lawrence Mem. Hosp., 409 F. Supp. 831, 838 (D. Kan. 1992).
24. See, e.g., St. Mary's Hosp., Inc. v. Brinson, 685 So. 2d 33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(holding that Florida recognizes the cause of action); Sponco Mfg., Inc. v. Alcover, 656 So. 2d 629
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that Florida recognizes the cause of action under appropriate
circumstances).
25. Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995).
26. 938 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. App. 1997).
27. 956 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. App. 1997). See also Brewer v. Dowling, 862 S.W.2d 156, 160 n.5
(Tex. App. 1993).
28. 597 N.E.2d 616 (111. 1992). See also Mayfield v. Acme Barrel Co., 629 N.E.2d 690, 695
(111. App. Ct. 1994). Note: The Illinois Supreme Court in Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d
267 (Ill. 1995), under the facts of the case, did not reach the issue of whether Illinois recognizes
intentional spoliation of evidence as an independent tort. See also Anthony v. Security Pac. Fin.
Servs., Inc., 75 F.3d 311 (7th Cir. 1996) and Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 501 N.E.2d 1312 (111.
1986).
29. 326 N.W.2d 458 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
30. 597 A.2d 543 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (analogizing this cause of action to
spoliation of evidence). See also Hirsch v. Gen. Motors Corp., 628 A.2d 1108, 1115 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1993).
31. See generally Rouse v. Chandler, 658 So. 2d 405 (Ala. 1995) and Christian v. Kenneth
Chandler Constr. Co., 658 So. 2d 408 (Ala. 1995) (companion cases); Peek v. State Auto Mut, Ins.
Co., 661 So. 2d 737 (Ala. 1995) (holding that the facts of the case did not warrant recognition of
a new tort for spoliation of evidence against third parties); Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d
267, 273 (I1. 1995); Mayfield v. Acme Barrel Co., 629 N.E.2d 690 (i1. App. Ct. 1994) (finding no
prejudicial injury as the result of the spoliation of evidence); Panich v. Iron Wood Prods. Corp., 445
N.W.2d 795 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, 456
N.W.2d 434 (Minn. 1990); Baugher v. Gates Rubber Co., Inc., 863 S.W.2d 905, 910 (Mo. Ct. App.
1993); Pharr v. Cortese, 559 N.Y.S. 2d 780 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990); Kelly v. St. Mary Hosp., 694 A.2d
355 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
32. See Gardner v. Blackston, 365 S.E.2d 545, 546 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988); Weigl v. Quincy
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tion that gives an adverse inference against the spoliator without recognizing
intentional spoliation of evidence as a separate tort action," while other states
have imposed a conclusive presumption of negligence against the spoliator."
A New Jersey court in Viviano v. CBS, Inc. extended the new tort beyond
intentional spoliation of evidence to include the "willful concealment of
evidence."" To state a claim for intentional or fraudulent concealment of
evidence, plaintiff must demonstrate the following elements: (1) defendant had
a legal obligation to disclose the evidence; (2) the undisclosed evidence was
material to the plaintiff's case; (3) plaintiff could not have readily learned about
the evidence without disclosure by the defendant; (4) defendant intentionally
failed-to disclose the evidence; and (5) reliance on the nondisclosure resulted in
harm to the plaintiff.36
The facts of Viviano involved an employee injured in a work-related
accident who brought a products liability suit against the manufacturer. During
the course of her employment, a memorandum was inadvertently discovered that
indicated the proper manufacturer-defendant.The memo further revealed that her
Specialties Co., 601 N.Y.S.2d 774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (rejecting spoliation of evidence as a tort,
but recognizing a "common law cause of action against an employer for negligently or intentionally
impairing employee's right to sue third-party tortfeasor"); Malone v. Foster, 956 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.
App. 1997); and Brewer v. Dowling, 862 S.W.2d 156, 160 n.5 (Tex. App. 1993) (but see Ortega v.
Trevino, 938 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. App. 1997)). See also Harrison v. Davis, 478 S.E.2d 104 (W. Va.
Ct. App. 1996) (declining to decide whether to recognize the cause of action under the facts of the
case).
33. See Monsanto Co. v. Reed, 950 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1997); Miller v. Montgomery County,
494 A.2d 761 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985); DeLaughter v. Lawrence County Hosp., 601 So. 2d 818
(Miss. 1992); Brown v. Hamid, 856 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. 1993) (en banc); Brewer v. Dowling, 862
S.W.2d 156 (Tex. App. 1993).
34. Estate of LeMay v. Eli Lily & Co., 960 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. Wis. 1997); Campbell v.
William, 638 So. 2d 804 (Ala. 1994); May v. Moore, 424 So. 2d 596 (Ala. 1982); Wong v. City &
County of Honolulu, 665 P.2d 157, 160-161 (Haw. 1983); DeLaughter v. Lawrence County Hosp.,
601 So. 2d 818 (Miss. 1992); Stephens v. Bohlman, 909 P.2d 208 (Or. Ct. App. 1996). Cf. Public
Health Trust of Dade County v. Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987) (reversing appellate court's
granting of a conclusive presumption of negligence; instead, allowing a rebuttable presumption of
negligence). See also Sweet v. Sisters of Providence in Washington, 895 P.2d 484 (Alaska 1995)
(shifting the burden of proof on negligence and causation to the spoliator to prove nonexistence of
facts presumed where there was negligent spoliation of evidence); Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d
1239 (6th Cir. 1988). C. DeLaughter v. Lawrence County Hosp., 601 So. 2d 818 (Miss. 1992)
(finding that reversible error existed where the trial court gave an impermissible irrebuttable
presumption-of-negligence jury instruction and further holding that there is no shifting of the burden
of proof where the hospital negligently failed to maintain medical records. The court only allowed
a presumption that the evidence was disfavorable to the spoliator.).
35. 597 A.2d 543 (N.J. Super. .Ct. App. Div. 1991). See also Allis-Chalmer Corp. Prod. Liab.
Trust v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 702 A.2d 1336 (N.J. Super. App. Ct. Div. 1997); Baxt v. Liloia, 656
A.2d 835 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); Hirsch v. General Motors Corp., 628 A.2d I 108, 1115
(N.J. Super. CL Law Div. 1993).
36. Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 597 A.2d 543 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). See also Allis-
Chalmer, 702 A.2d 1336; Hirsch, 628 A.2d at 1115.
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employer had intended to conceal this information from the employee-plain-
tiff." A separate suit was brought against her employer in which the court
found that her employer had fraudulently concealed the evidence, and damages
were awarded.3" The court in Viviano analogized plaintiff's cause of action to
spoliation of evidence. 9 Both torts are "designed to remediate tortious
interference with a prospective economic advantage."4 However, one court has
refused to extend the concealment tort to the defendant's ability to defend a
lawsuit, holding instead that it is only applicable to protecting the plaintiff's
prospective claims."
2. Negligent Spoliation of Evidence
Even prior to the recognition of intentional spoliation of evidence, California
recognized negligent spoliation of evidence as a separate tort as early as 1983 in
Williams v. State. 2 Although the court in Williams found that there was no
duty to preserve the evidence, the court stated that it would recognize negligent
spoliation of evidence if there was a duty to preserve.43 In 1985, California
confirmed that recognition in Velasco v. Commercial Building Maintenance Co.,
but again found no duty." Negligent spoliation of evidence as a separate tort
was also recognized by Florida in Bondu v. Gurvich." The court in Bondu
found that a hospital had a duty to preserve the patient's medical records'" and
a breach of that duty resulted in the plaintiff's loss of her medical malpractice
claim. Since plaintiff proved prejudicial injury from the failure to preserve the
medical records, the court recognized a separate action against the hospital for
negligent spoliation of evidence. 7
Unlike intentional spoliation of evidence, negligent spoliation of evidence as
a separate tort has not been recognized beyond the states of California and
Florida. Some states have failed to recognize it because the facts did not support
it, but have inferred that the court would recognize the separate tort claim if the
proper facts were before it.' Rather than recognizing a separate tort claim,
37. Viviano, 597 A.2d at 545-46.
38. Id. at 547.
39. Id. at 549. See also Hirsch, 628 A.2d at 1115 (stating that the tort of fraudulent
concealment of evidence is analogous to the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence).
40. Fox v. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp., 658 A.2d 732, 735 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
41. Id.
42. 664 P.2d 137 (Cal. 1983).
43. Id. at 141.
44. 215 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
45. 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
46. Id. at 1312-13.
47. Id. at 1313.
48. See generally Estate of Day v. Willis, 897 P.2d 78 (Alaska 1995) (finding that plaintiff
could not state a claim for the underlying cause of action; therefore, the spoliation-of-evidence claim
must also fall); Sweet v. Sisters of Providence, 895 P.2d 484 (Alaska 1995) (implying that had the
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some courts are recognizing a claim for negligent spoliation of evidence under
traditional principles of negligence. 9 Other states have chosen to grant a
presumption or inference against the spoliator rather than recognizing a separate
tort claim.50 Still other courts have shifted the burden of proof where there is
negligent spoliation of evidence.5"
The above section was an overview of the recognition by various states of
both intentional and negligent spoliation of evidence as a separate tort. The next
section of this comment will discuss the various factors which the court examines
when determining whether to recognize the claim as a viable cause of action.
These factors include whether the spoliation was done through intentional acts
or negligent acts; whether a duty to preserve the evidence existed; whether
alternative remedies are available; whether there is prejudicial injury and
damages; and whether the spoliator was a party or a third party.
B. Factors Examined by the Courts in Deciding Whether to Recognize
Spoliation of Evidence as a Separate Tort
1. Intentional Spoliation and Bad Faith
One of the key factors a court reviews in determining whether to allow a
separate tort claim is whether the spoliation was done intentionally or negligently.
The idea of someone intentionally destroying or altering evidence leaves a
malicious impression, which usually leads to the imposition by the court of harsher
remedies than where someone negligently spoliates evidence. 2 Several states
hospital intentionally destroyed the medical records, a separate tort for intentional spoliation of
evidence would have been recognized by the court); Mayfield v. Acme Barrel Co., 629 N.E.2d 690
(I11. App. Ct. 1994) (finding no prejudicial injury under the facts of the case); Koplin v. Rosel Well
Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177 (Kan. 1987) (finding no duty under the facts of the case); Federated
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litehfield Precision Components, 456 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. 1990); Baugher v. Gates
Rubber Co., 863 S.W.2d 905, 912-14 (Mo. App. 1993); Panich v. Iron Wood Products Corp., 445
N.W.2d 795 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
49. E.g., Anthony v. Security Pac. Fin. Servs., Inc., 75 F.3d 311 (7th Cir. 1996); Boyd v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267 (Il. 1995); Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185 (N.M.
1995); Federated Mut. Ins., 456 N.W. 2d at 436; Weigl v. Quincy Specialties Co., 601 N.Y.S.2d 774
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (rejecting spoliation of evidence as a tort, but recognizing a "common law
cause of action against an employer for negligently or intentionally impairing employee's right to sue
third-party tortfeasor"). See also infra notes 98, 176 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir. 1988); Nation-Wide Check Corp.
v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214 (1st Cir. 1982); Public Health Trust of Dade County v.
Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987); Monsanto Co. v. Reed, 950 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1997). See also
supra note 33 and infra notes 67, 87, 193, 197, 208 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 34 and Infra notes 75 and 174, 197 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Teletron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107, 130 (S.D. Fla. 1987)
(holding that where there is intentional destuction of evidence, default judgment is the only
appropriate sanction); Stubli v. Big D Int'l Trucks, Inc., 810 P.2d 785, 788 (Nev. 1991) (holding that
dismissal of plaintiff's products liability action was warranted by the intentional spoliation of
evidence by plaintiff's attorney and that imposition of a lesser sanction would be insufficient).
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have expressly recognized a separate tort for intentional spoliation of evidence.
Those states include California, 53 Alaska, 4 Ohio,'- Indiana, ' Kansas, 7 Flor-
ida,"' and New Mexico. 9 In addition, Illinois recognized "an implied statutory
cause of action for spoliation of evidence;"0 New Jersey recognized a separate
tort for "intentional concealment of evidence";6 ' and Michigan recognized a
separate tort for "intentional interference with economic relations."6
The elements of intentional spoliation of evidence are as follows: (1)
pending or probable litigation involving the plaintiff; (2) knowledge by the
defendant of the existence or likelihood of the litigation; (3) intentional "acts of
spoliation" on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the plaintiff's case;
(4) disruption of the plaintiff's case; and (5) damages proximately caused by the
acts of the defendant.' In addition to those elements, the courts that have
recognized intentional spoliation of evidence as a tort emphasized that there must
be a duty to preserve the evidence.' 4
Another element required is a willful purpose of the spoliator to interfere
with the plaintiff's litigation. The court in Smith v. Howard Johnson held that for
the cause of action to exist, there must be a "willful destruction of evidence by
defendant designed to disrupt plaintiffs case.""' Such willful intent may be
53. Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rp.. 829 (Cal. Ct App. 1984).
54. Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986).
55. Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio 1993) and reaffirmed by the court
in Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Mcd. Ctr., 635 N.E.2d 331 (Ohio 1994).
56. Levinson v. The Citizens Nat'l Bank of Evansville, 644 N.E.2d 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
57. Foster v. Lawrence Mem. Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 831, 838 (D. Kan. 1992).
58. See, e.g., St. Mary's Hosp., Inc. v. Brinson, 685 So. 2d 33 (Fla. Dist. C. App. 1996)
(holding that Florida recognizes the cause of action); Sponco Mfg., Inc. v. Alcover, 656 So. 2d 629
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that Florida recognizes the cause of action under appropriate
circumstances).
59. Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995).
60. 597 N.E.2d 616 (I1. 1992) (recognizing the statutory cause of action where a hospital failed
to maintain x-rays in violation of that state's X-Ray Retention Act). See also Mayfield v. Acme
Barrel Co., 629 N.E. 2d 690, 695 (II1. App. Ct. 1994).
61. See Hirsh v. General Motors Corp., 628 A.2d 1108 (N.J. Super. CL Law Div. 1993) and
Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 597 A.2d 543 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). See also Fox v. Mercedes-
Benz Credit Corp., 658 A.2d 732 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (refusing to extend the
concealment tort to defendant's ability to defend a lawsuit; it is only applicable to protecting
plaintiff's prospective claims); Baxt v. Liloia, 656 A.2d 835 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
62. See Jackovich v. General Adjustment Bureau, 326 NW.2d 458 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
63, Solano v. Delancy, 264 Cal. Rptr. 721, 729 (Cal. CL App. 1989); see also Foster v.
Lawrence Mem. Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 831, 836 (D. Kan. 1992) (outlining slightly different elements
for an intentional-spoliation-of-evidence claim).
64. See Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rpt'. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) and Hazen v.
Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986) (holding that a duty existed because the
spoliator had promised to preserve the evidence); Levinson v. the Citizens Nat'l Bank of Evansville,
644 N.E.2d 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that Indiana recognizes the tort of intentional
spoliation of evidence, but only where a duty exists and no such duty was found in that case).
65. 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038 (Ohio 1993).
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found when the spoliator had notice or knowledge of the pending or potential
litigation.6
Rather than recognizing a new tort, other states have allowed an adverse
inference or presumption against the spoliator where there is intentional conduct
on the part of the spoliator.'7 The missing evidence is presumed to be
unfavorable to the spoliator. The court in Sulliyan v. General Motors Corp.
stated that the spoliation of evidence must be "intentional and for the purpose of
depriving the opposing party of evidence in order to create an adverse infer-
ence ... ."" Some courts refer to this adverse inference as the "evidentiary
spoliation doctrine." 9
Of those cases that impose the adverse inference or presumption, many
require bad faith on the part of the spoliator.70 As stated in Thurman-Bryant
Electric Supply Co. v. Unisys Corp., "[s]uch a presumption or inference arises
only where the spoliation or destruction was intentional, and indicates fraud and
a desire to suppress the truth .... ,7' Even in such a case, the court in
Thurman-Bryant held that such a presumption was rebuttable.7" The most
lenient courts have allowed the adverse presumption only if there was no
satisfactory explanation offered by the intentional spoliator."
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., DeLaughter v. Lawrence County Hosp., 601 So. 2d 818, 821 (Miss. 1992);
Brewer v. Dowling, 862 S.W.2d 156, 159 (Tex. App. 1993); Brown v. Hamid, 856 S.W.2d 51 , 56-57
(Mo. 1993). Note: The following are examples of cases which applied the adverse inference as a
sanction where plaintiff never pleads a separate cause of action for spoliation of evidence: Bashir
v. Amtrak, 119 F.3d 929 (11 th Cit. 1997) (requiring bad faith); Keller v. U.S., 58 F.3d 1194 (7th
Cir. 1995) (requiring bad faith); Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148 (4th Cit. 1995) (bad
faith not required); Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326 (3d Cit. 1995); Donato v.
Fitzgibbons, 172 F.R.D. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (requiring bad faith); Anderson v. Litzenberg, 694 A.2d
150 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (bad faith not required); Shaffer v. RWP Group, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 19
(E.D.N.Y. 1996); Toste v. Lewis Controls, Inc., No. C-95-O1366-MHP, 1996 WL 101189 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (bad faith not required); Rice v. U.S., 917 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1996); Stephens v. Bohlman,
909 P.2d 208 (Or. Ct. App. 1996); Stuart v. State, 907 P.2d 783 (Idaho 1995).
'68. 772 F. Supp. 358, 362 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (quoting Banks v. Canton Hardware Co., 103
N.E.2d 568, 573 (Ohio 1952)).
69. See Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 1995); Simmons v. Mercedes-
Benz of North Am., Inc., No. Civ. A.95-2705, 1996 WL 103796 (E.D. Pa. March 7, 1996); Stuart
v. State, 907 P.2d 783 (Idaho 1995); Brown v. Hamid, 856 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. 1993).
70. See, e.g., Bashir, 119 F.3d 929; Keller v. U.S., 58 F.3d 1194 (7th Cit. 1995); Berthold-
Jennings Lumber Co. v. St. Louis, 80 F.2d 32, 41-42 (8th Cit. 1935); Wright v. Illinois Cent. R.R.
Co., 868 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Miss. 1994); Barbera v. I.V. DiMartino, 702 A.2d 1370 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1997); Thurman-Byrant Elec. Supp. Co. v. Unisys Corp., No. 03A01-CV00152, 1991 WL
222256, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1991); Brown v. Hamid, 856 S.W.2d 51, 56-57 (Mo. 1993);
Haynes v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 350 N.E.2d 20 (111. CL App. 1976). Cf Vodusek v.
Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 1995); Toste v. Lewis Controls, Inc., 1996 WL 101189
(N.D. Cal. 1996); Rodriguez v. Schutt, 896 P.2d 881 (Co. CL App. 1994), cert. granted.
71. Thurman-Bryant, 1991 WL 222256, at *5.
72. Id. See also Brewer v. Dowling, 862 S.W.2d 156, 159 (Tex. App. 1993) (holding that a
rebuttable presumption is appropriate).
73. See, e.g., Stanojev v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 643 F.2d 914 (2d Cit. 1981); Vick v. Texas
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Some courts allow a shift of the burden of proof where the evidence has
been intentionally spoliated.7 ' Another manner of combating the prejudicial
injury resulting from such destruction of evidence is a presumption of liability.
Several courts have ruled that the intentional destruction of evidence warrants a
presumption of negligence and/or causation against the spoliator.7,
2. Negligent Spoliation
Negligent spoliation of evidence has been treated with much more kindness
by the courts. In general, courts view the negligent act as more benign than that
of the intentional wrongdoer. Only two states have recognized the cause of
action of negligent spoliation of evidence as an independent tort. Those states
are California" and Florida." One court has specifically refused to adopt the
cause of action as a new tort.n
Many courts have refused to recognize a negligent-spoliation-of-evidence
claim because the specific facts lacked one or more of the elements required.
The elements of negligent spoliation of evidence are as follows: (1) existence
Employment Comm., 514 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 637 (2d
Cir. 1950) (finding that the spoliator's routine practice of destroying the original records of wire
tappings after thirty to sixty days was a satisfactory explanation). See also Delaughter v. Lawrence
County Hosp:, 601 So. 2d 818, 821 (Miss. 1992) (each inferring that a routine explanation would
make the adverse presumption inapplicable); Brown v. Hamid, 856 W.W.2d 51, 57 (Mo. 1993); and
Thurman-Bryant, 1991. WL 222256, at $5.
74. E.g., Amlan, Inc. v. Detroit Diesel Corp., 651 So. 2d 701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). But
see DeLaughter v. Lawrence County Hosp., 601 So. 2d 818 (Miss. 1992) (finding that reversible
error where the trial court gave an impermissible irrebuttable presumption-of-negligence jury
instruction and further holding that there is no shifting of the burden of proof where the hospital
negligently failed to maintain medical records. The court only allowed a presumption that the
evidence was disfavorable to the spoliator.).
75. Estate of LeMay v. Eli Lily & Co., 960 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. Wis. 1997); Campbell v.
William, 638 So. 2d 804 (Ala. 1994); May v. Moore, 424 So. 2d 596 (Ala. 1982); Wong v. City &
County of Honolulu, 665 P. 2d 157, 160-61 (Haw. 1983); Stephens v. Bohlman, 909 P. 2d 208 (Or.
Ct. App. 1996). Cf Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987)
(reversing appellate court's granting of a conclusive presumption of negligence; instead, allowing
rebuttable presumption ofnegligence). See also Sweet v. Sisters of Providence in Washington, 895
P.2d 484 (Alaska 1995) shifting the burden of proof on negligence and causation to the spoliator to
prove nonexistence of facts presumed where defendant negligently destroyed medical records); Welsh
v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir. 1988). Cf DeLaughter v. Lawrence County Hosp., 601
So. 2d 818 (Miss. 1992) (finding reversible error where the trial court gave an impermissible
irrebuttable presumption-of-negligence jury instruction and further holding that there is no shifting
of the burden of proof where the hospital negligently failed to maintain medical records. The court
only allowed a presumption that the evidence was disfavorable to the spoliator.).
76. Veiasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maintenance Co., 215 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. CL App. 1985).
77. Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1984).
78. 5636 Alpha Road v. NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank, 879 F. Supp. 655 (N.D. Tex. 1995). But
see Ortega v. Trevino, 938 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. App. 1997) (recognizing intentional spoliation of
evidence as a separate tort) (note: Ortega was later criticized by another Texas appellate court in
Malone v. Foster, 956 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. App. 1997)).
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of a potential civil action; (2) a legal or contractual duty to preserve the evidence
relevant to the potential civil action; (3) a breach of duty by destruction of the
evidence; (4) a prejudicial injury; (5) a causal connection between the destruction
of the evidence and the injury; and (6) damages.79 All of these elements must
be satisfied for a court to recognize the tort.
One case that held that there was no existence of a potential civil action was
Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co." The court found that at the time the bicycle
repairman discarded the evidence, no lawsuit had been brought against the
manufacturer, and the plaintiff had not notified the repairman of the potential
lawsuit.8
Numerous courts have not recognized negligent spoliation of evidence
because on the facts of the case no duty to preserve the evidence existed. 2
Other courts have found that the spoliation of evidence was not a proximate
cause of the injury. 3 The court in Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp. concluded
that it did not have to "decide whether Illinois law would recognize a spoliation
tort because the lack of an indispensable element of the tort [ie., causation) is
fatal to the plaintiffs claim." 4 Other cases have held that spoliation of
evidence resulted in no prejudicial injury.8 Finally, some courts have refused
79. Continental Ins. Co. v. Herman, 576 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
80. 876 P.2d 415 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
81. In addition, the court found the repairman had no duty to preserve the evidence.
82. See, e.g., Walsh v. Caidin, 232 Cal. App. 3d 159 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that
surviving spouse had no duty to preserve body of deceased after defendants had requested an
autopsy); Bums v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415 (Utah CL App. 1994). See also Parker
v. Thyssen Mining Constr., Inc., 428 So. 2d 615 (Ala. 1983), Chidichimo v. University of Chicago
Press, 681 N.E.2d 107 (I1. App. Ct. 1997); Murphy v. Target Prods., 580 N.E.2d 687 (Ind. Ct. App.
1991); Panich v. Iron Wood Prods. Corp., 445 N.W.2d 795 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Allis-Chalmers
Corp. Prod. Liab. Trust v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 702 A.2d 1336 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997);
Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995); and Diehl v. Rocky Mountain
Communications, Inc., 818 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. App. 1991) (each holdijig that employers have no duty
to preserve evidence which might be used in employee's third-party liability action). Cf General
Cinema Beverages of Miami, Inc., 689 So. 2d 276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (imposing a statutory
duty on the employer to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of an employee against a
third-party tortfeasor.).
83. See, e.g., Murray v. Farmers Ins. Co., 769 P.2d 101, 107 (Idaho 1990) (holding that the
jury found the plaintiffs would not have won their case against the manufacturer and thus the alleged
legal malpractice was not a proximate cause of the injury); Chidichimo v. University of Chicago
Press, 681 N.E.2d 197 (I1. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that the destroyed records did not cause plaintiff
to be unable to prove the underlying suit); Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 501 N.E.2d 1312, 1321
(ill. App. Ct. 1986) (holding that the former employee failed to plead a nexus between the destruction
of the ledger books and alleged wrongful discharge and, therefore, did not prove any injury as a
proximate cause resulting from the destruction of evidence); and Brown v. Hamid, 856 S.W.2d 51,
55-56 (Mo. 1993) (holding that there was no causal connection between the missing medical records
and the alleged medical malpractice).
84. 501 N.E.2d 1312, 1321 (I1. App. Ct. 1986).
85. Id. (holding that the plaintiff had "no cause of action for destruction of evidence in [the]
case because she suffered no significant impairment in an ability to prove the underlying lawsuit").
See also Continental Ins. Co. v. Herman, 576 So. 2d 313, 314-15 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1990) (holding
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to recognize spoliation of evidence because of the potential for speculative
damages under the facts of the case."
A majority of the courts that have allowed an action for negligent spoliation
of evidence have granted a presumption against the spoliator.87 Some courts
base their reasoning on "contra spolatorem omnia praesumuntur," which
translates to "all things presumed against the destroyer.""8 Even if the court
finds negligent spoliation has occurred, there is no consensus as to whether bad
faith must also be found for the presumption to apply. A Massachusetts court,
in Nation-Wide Check Corp., Inc. v. Forest Hills Distributors, Inc., held that bad
faith was not required for the inference or presumption to be imposed against the
spoliator, 9 but did require proof that the spoliator "had notice that the docu-
ments were relevant at the time he failed to produce them or destroyed them."9
Other cases, howeyer, have required bad faith for the inference or presumption
to be given.9 '
Once the presumption has been allowed, the courts are split whether this
presumption creates a prima facie case in favor of the plaintiff. 2 The court in
Stanojev v. Ebasco Services, Inc. held that the adverse presumption was not
enough to meet plaintiff's burden of proof that he had been discriminated against
on the basis of age.93 In contrast, Public Health Trust of Dade County v.
that since the plaintiffs won the underlying lawsuit at an arbitration hearing, there was no prejudicial
injury as a result of the destroyed evidence); Mayfield v. Acme Barrel Co., 629 N.E.2d 690, 695-96
(111. App. Ct. 1994) (holding that there had been no injury, since the underlying lawsuit was still
pending; i.e., the plaintiffs didn't "allege that they [had] lost any cause of action that they might have
had against the manufacturer or distributor"); Marinelli v. Mitts & Merrill, 696 A.2d 55 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1997) (holding that destruction of the evidence did not prejudice plaintiff); Pharr v.
Cortese, 559 N.Y.S. 2d 780, 781-82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (holding that the plaintiff was not
"precluded from pursuing her [medical malpractice] claim" by the falsification of medical records;
thus, she failed to prove any prejudicial injury); and Mensch v. BIC Corp., No. 90-6002, 1992 WL
236965 (E.D. Pa. Sept. I7, 1992) (finding that the manufacturer did not suffer any prejudicial injury
as a result of the spoliation of evidence because the missing components of the lighter were irrelevant
to the lawsuit).
86. See Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, 456 N.W.2d 434 (Minn.
1990); Baugher v. Gates Rubber Co., 863 S.W.2d 905 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). Cf Smith v. Superior
Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that speculative damages was not a bar to
recognizing the tort claim).
87. See Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir. 1988); Nation-Wide Check Corp. v.
Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214 (ist Cir. 1982); Public Health Trust of Dade County v.
Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987); Delaughter v. Lawrence County Hosp., 601 So. 2d 818 (Miss.
1992). See also supra notes 33, 50, 67, 75 and infra notes 193, 208 and accompanying text.
88. See. e.g., Brown v. Hamid, 856 S.W.2d 51, 56 (Mo. 1993).
89. 692 F.2d 214, 219 (Ist Cir. 1982).
90. Id. at 218.
91. See Stanojev v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 923-24 (2d Cir. 1981); Berthold-
Jennings Lumber Co. v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & So. Ry. Co., 80 F.2d 32, 36 (8th Cir. 1935);
Telectron Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107 (S.D. Fla. 1987). See also supra notes 67,
70 and accompanying text (discussing bad faith requirement for intentional spoliation of evidence).
92. See supra notes 34, 51, 75 and infra notes 174, 197 and accompanying text.
93. 643 F.2d 914, 923 (2d Cir. 1981). However, Stanojev may be explained by the fact that
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Valcin held that the adverse presumption shifts the burden of proof onto the
spoliator, but is rebuttable.9"
Other courts have found that the adverse presumption is inapplicable where
a reasonable explanation for the spoliation of evidence is given;95 where the
spoliator had no duty to preserve the evidence;" or where the party upon whom
the inference would be imposed had no control over the spoliator.97
Another basis some courts have stated for not recognizing negligent
spoliation of evidence as a separate tort is that the claim can be stated under
traditional negligence law.s
3. Duty to Preserve the Evidence
For both intentional spoliation and negligent spoliation, an essential element
to the plaintiff's case is a duty to preserve the evidence on the part of the
spoliator. Such a duty can be imposed by statute, by contract, or by law. In line
with this reasoning, the court in Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc. held that
Kansas would only recognize the cause of action for a separate tort of "intention-
al interference with a prospective civil action by spoliation of evidence" where
the court did not find any nexus between the missing personnel records and the allegation of age
discrimination, as well as the court stating that the defendant offered a reasonable explanation for the
missing records. Id. See also DeLaughter v. Lawrence County Hosp., 601 So. 2d 818 (Miss. 1992)
(finding that reversible error existed where the trial court gave an impermissible irrebuttable
presumption-of-negligence jury instruction and further holding that there is no shifting of the burden
of proof where the hospital negligently failed to maintain medical records. The court only allowed
a presumption that the evidence was disfavorable to the spoliator.).
94. 507 So. 2d 596, 599-601 (Fla. 1987) (involving a plaintiff in a medical malpractice claim
against a hospital who sought relief from the court for destruction of medical records). See also
Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1248 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that, "The burden shifts to the
defendant-spoliator to rebut the presumption and disprove the inferred element of plaintiff's prima
facie case"). The court in Welsh went on to state that the policies underlying the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur support the granting of a rebuttable presumption to the negligent spoliator. Id. at 1248-49.
95. E.g., United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629,637 (2d Cir. 1950) (finding that the spoliator's
routine practice of destroying the original records of wire tappings after thirty to sixty days was a
satisfactory explanation); Stanojev v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 643 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1981); Vick v. Texas
Employment Comm., 514 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Brown v. Hamid, 856 S.W.2d 51, 57
(Mo. 1993); Thurman-Bryant Elec. Supp. Co. v. Unisys Corp., No. 03A01-CV00152, 1991 WL
222256, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1991); and Delaughter, 601 So. 2d at 821 (each inferring that
a routine explanation would make the adverse presumption inapplicable).
96. See, e.g., Hansen v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
97. See, e.g., Townsend v. American Insulated Panel Co., Inc., 174 F.R.D. I (D. Mass. 1997)
(holding that plaintiff was not subject to sanction for spoliation of evidence where plaintiff did not
have any control over the evidence); Transamerica Ins. Group v. Maytag, Inc., 650 N.E.2d 169 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1994) (reversing the trial court's dismissal where the evidence was not under the insurance
company's control at the time the destruction occurred; rather, a less severe sanction was appropriate
under the facts of the case).
98. E.g., Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267 (I1. 1995); Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Litchfield Precision Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434,436 (Minn. 1990); Coleman v. Eddy Potash,
Inc., 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995). See also supra note 49 and infra note 176 and accompanying text.
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the facts of the case indicated there was a "contract, agreement, voluntary
assumption of duty, or special relationship of the parties. ..
State statutes that require the retention of patients' medical records and x-
rays for a specified period of time have been at issue in many medical
malpractice cases. It has been successfully argued that those statutes impose a
duty upon the health care providers to preserve the medical records and x-rays.
Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hospital of Decatur involved an Illinois statute that
mandated that hospitals retain x-rays for at least five years. When a patient's x-
rays were found to be missing, the court recognized that the plaintiff had a cause
of action against the hospital for breach of that duty.' The court in Rodgers,
however, chose to decide the case on statutory grounds instead of basing its
decision on a separate tort.'0' Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court in Rodgers
"recognized an implied statutory cause of action for spoliation of evidence under
the X-Ray Retention Act. .... 102
Bondu v. Gurvich was a case that did recognize the separate tort of negligent
spoliation of evidence when there was a breach of a statutory duty to preserve
medical records.'03 Rather than recognizing a separate tort action, the court in
Delaughter v. Lawrence County Hospital granted an adverse inference against the
spoliator when the medical records were only negligently destroyed.'" Brewer
v, Dowling allowed a rebuttable adverse presumption,'"3 but limited that
adverse presumption to intentional spoliation of evidence, and refused to extend
such a presumption under the facts because the medical records were merely
missing and not intentionally destroyed."° It is interesting to note that the
court in Brewer never discussed any statutory duty to retain the medical records;
therefore, assuming such a statute had existed in Texas, the court might have
held differently.' 7
Another statutory duty was imposed by a court in General Cinema
Beverages of Miami, Inc. v. Mortimer under Florida's workers' compensation
laws which required the employer to "cooperate with an employee in investigat-
99. 734 P.2d 1177, 1183 (Kan. 1987).
100. 597 N.E.2d 616, 620 (I1. 1992).
101. Id. See also. Harrison v. Davis, 478 S.E.2d 104 (W. Va. 1996) (declining to determine
whether the defendant hospital had a duty to preserve the medical records since the claim was time
barred; therefore the court did not have to reach the determination as to the recognition of spoliation
of evidence as a separate claim).
102. Mayfield v. Acme Barrel Co., 629 N.E.2d 690, 695 (111. App. Ct. 1994).
103. 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. DisL Ct. App. 1984).
104. 601 So. 2d 818, 821 (Miss. 1992).
105. 862 S.W.2d 156, 159 (Tex. App. 1993).
106. Id. at 160. To a certain extent, this case can be criticized for encouraging "missing"
documents.
107. See also Brown v. Hamid, 856 S.W.2d 5I (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (involving medical records
that were missing before the medical records retention statute went into effect). The court in Brown
did not find any independent duty to maintain medical records. Instead, the court stated that under
the facts of this case "[a] medical malpractice action [was] an adequate remedy." Id. at 57.
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ing and prosecuting claims against a third-party tortfeasor."'0 s Although only
an adverse inference was applied in Estate of LeMay v. Eli Lilly & Co., the court
found a statutory duty existed under the Code of Federal Rules, requiring the
manufacturer to preserve a medical device."°9 The court further noted that the
adverse inference could be sufficient to infer liability, thereby precluding
summary judgment for the manufacturer."'
Besides duties imposed by statutes, contractual or legal duties may be
imposed. A legal duty may also be imposed as a result of an attorney/client
relationship."' One such duty was found in Murray v. Farmers Ins. Co.,
where plaintiff instituted a legal malpractice claim against his former attorney for
failure to have an automobile examined prior to its destruction. The plaintiff
contended that once the car was destroyed before examination by his expert, the
plaintiff's products liability claim against the manufacturer was precluded." '
The court found that there was a duty to preserve the evidence, but no causation
element was lacking as plaintiff failed to prove he probably would have won his
lawsuit against the automobile manufacturer."' The approach in Murray is
consistent with the approach in most states."' In a legal malpractice claim, the
plaintiff must first prove he would have won the underlying lawsuit to show any
prejudicial injury as a result of the legal malpractice.
A contractual duty was found in Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co." 6  Miller
involved an automobile accident which resulted in a potential products liability
claim against the automobile manufacturer. A verbal agreement was reached
between plaintiff's father and the insurance agent whereby the agent promised
to preserve the car and make it available for plaintiff's expert to inspect.
However, before the inspection could take place, the insurance company sold the
car to a salvage yard where it was destroyed." 7 Thus, the court held that the
insurance company breached its contractual agreement and, therefore, the plaintiff
108. 689 So. 2d 276, 277 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). See also Weigl v. Quincy Specialties Co.,
601 N.Y.S.2d 774. 777 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (recognizing a "common law cause of action against
an employer for negligently and intentionally impairing employee's right to sue third-party
tortteasor").
109. 960 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. Wis. 1997). Note: Plaintiff did not plead the separate tort of
spoliation of evidence.
110. Id. at 186.
Ill. E.g., Murray v. Farmers Ins. Co., 796 P.2d 101 (Idaho 1990).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 103.
114. Id. at 107.
115. See, e.g., Baugher v. Gates Rubber Co., 863 S.W.2d 905 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Federated
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components. 456 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. 1990). See also Paul
Gary Kerkorian, Comment, Negligent Spoliation of Evidence: Skirting the "Suit Within a Suit"
Requirement of Legal Malpractice Actions, 41 Hastings LJ. 1077 (1990). Cf. Jenkins v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 422 So. 2d 1109 (La. 1982) (modifying the suit-within-the-suit requirement for
legal malpractice claims). See also infra note 320 and accompanying text.
116. 573 So. 2d 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
117. Id. at 25-26.
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was entitled to the legal protection of a separate breach-of-contract claim."I8
The court compared this case to Bondu and the contractual duty imposed by
agreement in that case. Under either a duty imposed by agreement or a duty
imposed by law, the court concluded that "the plaintiff's interests are entitled to
legal protection against defendant's conduct";119 "That the duty arises from a
valid contract, rather than a statute or administrative regulation, is no basis for
a different result.' ' 20
Besides a statutory, legal, or contractual duty, a duty may be created through
a special relationship or a voluntary assumption. That is, if a party promised to
preserve evidence which is later destroyed, courts have held that a duty was
created by the parties' promissory relationship.''
While the above-mentioned cases held that a duty existed, Walsh v. Caidin
found no duty to preserve the evidence on the part of the spoliator.'2 Walsh
involved a surviving spouse who cremated her deceased husband's remains
despite requests from medical malpractice defendants for an autopsy. The court
stated that the wife had sole authority over the disposition of the body, and thus
she owed no legal duty to have an autopsy performed "because the law does not
treat a human dead body as merely another form of physical evidence."
23
Another line of cases which has routinely held that no duty exists is those
involving worker's compensation and spoliation by a third party. Numerous
courts have held that neither ordinary tort law nor a state's workers' compensa-
tion act imposes a duty on the employer to preserve evidence that might be used
in an employee's third-party claim.'24 The reasoning used by the courts in
these cases is based on the premise that a third-party spoliator (i.e., the employer)
usually does not have any interest in the outcome of the original lawsuit and
often is unaware of the possibility of a potential lawsuit. 2s However, the court
in Weigl v. Quincy Specialties Co. implied that an employer would have a duty
to preserve the evidence if he had been informed of the pending lawsuit and was




121. See Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986); Smith v. Superior
Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
122. 283 Cal. Rptr. 326 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
123. Id. at 327. See also Foley v. St. Thomas Hosp., 906 S.W.2d 448 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)
for a similar result.
124. See Parker v. Thyssen Mining Constr., Inc., 428 So. 2d 615 (Ala. 1983); Murphy v. Target
Prods., 580 N.E.2d 687 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Panich v. Iron Wood Prods. Corp., 445 N.W.2d 795
(Mich. CL App. 1989); and Diehl v. Rocky Mountain Communications, Inc., 818 S.W.2d 183 (Tex.
App. 1991). Cf. General Cinema Beverages of Miami, Inc. v. Mortimer, 689 So. 2d 276 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1995) (holding a statutory duty exists under Florida's workers' compensation law).
125. Third-party duty to preserve evidence is discussed in greater detail in Section B, subsection
7 of this comment.
126. 601 N.Y.S.2d 774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993).
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Beverages of Miami, Inc. v. Mortimer found that a statutory duty existed under
Florida state law, requiring the employer to cooperate in the employee's
investigation and prosecution of claims against a third party." 7 The court in
Viviano v. CBS, Inc. went even further, imposing an affirmative duty upon the
employer to not conceal evidence relevant to a third-party action.' 8
4. Availability of Alternative Remedies
Another factor that plays an important role in the court's decision of whether
to recognize the separate tort of spoliation of evidence is the availability of
alternative remedies. The court in La Raia v. Superior Court of Maricopa held
that available tort law was sufficient to remedy the wrong.2 9 However, in La
Raia, plaintiff sued for physical injury resulting from the spraying of outdoor
roach spray inside her apartment and the subsequent intentional destruction of the
can of roach spray by the defendant. The court noted that spoliation of evidence
has only been recognized where plaintiff is suing for interference with an
ongoing or potential lawsuit, not physical damages. Thus, the court was correct
when it stated that a traditional tort claim is an appropriate remedy for personal
injury damages because a spoliation-of-evidence claim does not compensate for
damages to the person whereas a traditional tort claim does. The plaintiff in La
Raia did not allege any interference with ongoing litigation as the result of the
destruction of the evidence.
The court in Brown v. Hamid stated that the appropriate remedy for the
negligent spoliation of medical records in that case was a medical malpractice
action against the defendant physician. 3 One explanation for the court's
opinion may be that the Missouri statute which required retention of the medical
records had not been in effect at the time the spoliation occurred. Thus, the
court found no duty existed for the physician to preserve the medical records.
Also, the court in Brown found no causal connection between the missing
medical records and the medical malpractice claim. The courts have consistently
held that where no duty is found, they will not recognize spoliation of evidence
as a separate tort.
Miller v. Montgomery County is another case that refused to recognize
intentional spoliation of evidence as a separate tort because there was an
alternative remedy available; i.e., a jury instruction of an adverse presumption
0
127. General Cinema Beverages of Miami, 689 So. .2d 276.
128. 597 A.2d 543 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). The concealment must be fraudulent or
willful.
129. 722 P.2d 286 (Ariz. 1986).
130. 856 S.W.2d 51,57 (Mo. 1993). Cf. Temple Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) and Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 831
(Cal Ct. App. 1996) (each holding that the claim for intentional spoliation of evidence is not directly
related to the medical services provided; i.e., it does not arise out of the professional negligence).
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or inference against the spoliator.' For this reason, several courts have
allowed the adverse presumption rather than recognizing negligent and intentional
spoliation of evidence as independent torts." 2
Another alternative remedy some courts have allowed is a shifting of the
burden of proof.'33 Such a shifting of the burden of proof is. obviously more
onerous on the spoliator than a simple rebuttable presumption. In fact, several
courts have held that the adverse presumption is enough to prove plaintiff's
prima facie case. 3 '
Where there is an alternative remedy, some courts have held that the
recognition of spoliation of evidence as a separate tort is unnecessary.'35
However, one court emphasized that the fact that "other remedies exist does not
necessarily preclude [the court] from creating a new tort for further redress." '
The court in Federated Mutual further stated that the "rationale for this new tort
is that a potential civil action is deemed an interest worthy of legal protection from
undue interference.""' Thus, since a potential civil action is worthy of legal
protection, other available remedies should not hinder the courts from recognizing
the separate tort of spoliation of evidence under the rationale of Federated Mutual.
Furthermore, those courts embracing this new tort recognized the shortcomings of
the traditional remedies.'38 For example, discovery sanctions are not available
where the spoliator is a third party and sanctions do not compensate the plaintiff
for the prejudicial injury he has lost as a result of the spoliation.
5. Prejudicial Injury/Causation
Before a court will recognize spoliation of evidence, grant the evidentiary
spoliation doctrine of adverse presumption, or allow an alternative remedy, it
must find that the plaintiff was prejudiced by the defendant's conduct.
Unfortunately, prejudicial injury is often difficult to prove." 9
131. 494 A.2d 761 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
132. See Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir. 1988); Nation-Wide Check Corp. v.
Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214 (ist Cir. 1982); Public Health Trust of Dade County v.
Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987); DeLaughter v. Lawrence County Hosp., 601 So. 2d 818 (Miss.
1992); Brown v. Hamid, 856 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. 1993); Brewer v. Dowling, 862 S.W.2d 156 (Tex.
App. 1993).
133. See supra notes 34, 51, 75 and infra note 173 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 34, 51, 75 and infra notes 174, 197 and accompanying text.
135. See. e.g., Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hosp. of Decatur, 556 N.E.2d 913, 915-916 (I1. App. CL
1990).
136. See Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchifield Precision Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434,
437 (Minn. 1990).
137, Id. See also Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995).
138. E.g., Ortega v. Trevino, 938 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. App. 1997). See also supra note 14 and
accompanying text. See also Steffen Nolte, The Spoliation Tort: An Approach to Underlying
Principles, 26 St. Mary's L.J. 351, 360 (1995).
139. See, e.g., Sussman v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 971 F. Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(holding no underlying cause of action remained to which a claim for spoliation of evidence could
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. In Mayfield v. Acme Barrel Co., the court stated that "an indispensable
prerequisite to the maintenance of [a spoliation-of-evidence] action . .,. is a
showing of an actual injury proximately caused by the loss or destruction of the
evidence in question . *.. .""o "The threat of some future harm that has not
yet been realized is insufficient to satisfy this element ... .""' In fact,
speculative injury was the basis for denying the plaintiff a spoliation-of-evidence
claim in Williams v. Dunagan. "' The court in Williams stated that the plaintiff
only showed a "'possibility' that further inspection of the ladder might have
revealed a defect which caused the accident."'43 Williams may be explained
by the fact that Ohio required a high level of proof; i.e., the plaintiff must prove
that the destroyed evidence would have allowed him to win the underlying
suit. 14
4
As the Williams case illustrates, there may be different levels of proof
required by the courts in order for prejudicial injury to be found. The court in
Williams required the following elements to be proved by the plaintiff in a
negligent-spoliation-of-evidenceclaim: "1) the absence of the destroyed evidence
or the destruction of the evidence made it impossible for plaintiff to pursue the
separate civil action; and 2) plaintiff could prove that the destroyed evidence was
of such a nature as to enable successful pursuit of the civil action."'45 This is
a very high level of proof. The Supreme Court of Illinois rejected such a
stringent standard, and instead required a showing that plaintiff had "a reasonable
probability of succeeding in the underlying action."' 4
6
A slightly different level of proof was required by the court in Continental
Ins. Co. v. Herman.' 7 There the plaintiff had to prove that the negligent
destruction of evidence significantly impaired plaintiff's ability to prove the
underlying lawsuit. 4 ' Since the plaintiff won at an arbitration hearing, the
attach); Mensch v. BIC Corp., No. 90-6002, 1992 WL 236965, at 02 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 1992)
(holding that no prejudicial injury resulted from the lost evidence since the missing lighter parts were
irrelevant to the underlying lawsuit); Estate of Day v. Willis, 897 P.2d 78 (Alaska 1995) (holding
that plaintiff's underlying cause of action was not viable; therefore, the spoliation claim was
meritless); Continental Ins. Co. v. Herman, 576 So. 2d 313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
no prejudicial injury had occurred since the plaintiffs won the underlying lawsuit); Miller v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 650 So. 2d 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that plaintiff's failure to pursue the
underlying products liability claim bars the spoliation claim); Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 501
N.E.2d 1312 (I1. App. Ct. 1986) (holding that plaintiff failed to show any prejudicial injury).
140. 629 N.E.2d 690, 695 (III. App. Ct. 1994) (citation omitted).
141. Id.
142. No. 15870, 1993 WL 145764 (Ohio Ct. App. May 5, 1993).
143. Id. at *2.
144. Id.
145. Id. (emphasis added). See also Ortega v. Trevino, 938 S.W. 2d 219, 222 (Tex. App. 1997)
(requiring plaintiff to show that "absent the [spoliation], he would have been entitled to judgment in
the underlying action and the amount he would have recovered under the judgment.").
146. Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 271 n.2 (II1. 1995).
147. 576 So. 2d 313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
148. Id. at 315.
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court concluded that the spoliation of evidence did not significantly impair
plaintiff's underlying personal injury claim." 9
The lowest level of proof required by a court to prove prejudicial injury was
found in Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co.'" In that case, the plaintiff was only
required "to show that defendant's interference cost her an opportunity to prove
her [underlying] lawsuit."'' In contrast to Williams, the court concluded that
the plaintiff did not have to prove "but for the destruction of evidence, [s]he
would have prevailed in the underlying action." '
One way courts have tried to define prejudicial injury is by requiring the
plaintiff to first litigate the underlying lawsuit prior to bringing the spoliation-of-
evidence tort claim.. If the plaintiff lost at the first trial or was forced to take a
settlement, then the plaintiff had proved prejudicial injury as a result of the
spoliation of evidence.' 3 However, other courts have not required such a
showing because two separate trials are a waste of judicial resources.'54
6. Damages
A factor courts have looked at when determining if there was prejudicial
injury is whether there were any actual damages. The first case to recognize
149. Id.
150. 573 So. 2d 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
151. Id. at 31 (emphasis added). See also Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984).
152. Id. at 31 n.12. See also Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 837 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984).
153. See, e.g., Mohawk Mfg. & Supply Co. v. Lakes Tool Die & Eng'g, Inc., No. 92CI315,
1994 WL 85979, at '2 (N.D. Ill. March 12, 1994) (dismissing plaintiff's spoliation-of-evidence claim
as premature since plaintiff had not yet lost the underlying claim); Continental Ins. Co. v. Herman,
576 So. 2d 313, 314-15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that since the plaintiffs won the
underlying lawsuit at an arbitration hearing, there was no prejudicial injury as a result of the
destroyed evidence); Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307, 1311 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding that plaintiff's claim for negligent spoliation of evidence did not arise until summary
judgment was rendered against her in the underlying lawsuit); Mayfield v. Acme Barrel Co., 629
N.E.2d 690, 695-96 (I1. App. CL 1994) (holding that spoliation claim was premature because the
plaintiffs had not lost the underlying lawsuit prior to bringing their claim); Federated Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Litchfield Precision Components, 456 N.W.2d 434, 439 (Minn. 1990) (holding that the plaintiff
must first resolve the subrogation claim before bringing the spoliation-of-evidence claim); Baugher
v. Gates Rubber Co., 863 S.W.2d. 905, 914 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the plaintiff must
prove injury by receiving settlement or judgment of the underlying claim before bringing negligent-
spoliation-of-evidence claim); Viviano v. CBS,. Inc., 597 A.2d 543, 551 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1991) (holding that plaintiff's claim did not arise until after she settled the underlying lawsuit).
154. See. e.g., Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 837; Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 24, 28 n.7
(Fla. Dist. CL App. 1990); Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267 (I1. 1995); Smith v. Howard
Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038 (Ohio 1993). See also Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hosp. of Decatur,
556 N.E.2d 913, 918-19 (III. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that the appeals process did not have to be
exhausted before bringing a spoliation-of-evidence claim since "this requirement would result in a
needless waste of judicial resources .... ).
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spoliation of evidence as a separate tort, Smith v. Superior Court, acknowledged
that "the most troubling aspect of allowing a cause of action for intentional
spoliation of evidence is the requisite tort element of damages proximately
resulting from defendant's alleged act."'" The court went on to hold,
however, that the uncertainty of the plaintiff's damages did not bar the cause of
action since it was certain that at least some damages were incurred as a result
of the intentional spoliation."' Following the reasoning of Smith, the court in
Miller v. Allstate Insurance Co. stated that difficulty in proving damages would
not preclude the plaintiff from bringing a spoliation-of-evidence claim against the
defendant for breach of promise to preserve the evidence."' As stated by the
court in Ortega v. Trevino, "[r]elaxing the standard of proof from reasonable
certainty to a just and reasonable inference regarding the amount of
damages is consistent with the elementary tenants of justice and public
policy that would require the spoliator to bear the risk of the uncertainty
of the ensuing wrong."'38 In contrast, some courts have found that the
damages were too speculative, and therefore no cause of action exist-
ed. 1 9
There are only a few spoliation-of-evidence cases in which compensatory
damages are discussed by the court in any detail.' 6° In Viviano, the plaintiff
proved that the employer's fraudulent concealment of evidence caused her to lose
interest on her personal injury settlement with the manufacturer as well as to
incur additional expenses. The jury awarded $65,000 for loss of interest on the
settlement and $7,351.71 for the additional expenses. Viviano was not a
spoliation-of-evidence claim, rather an intentional-concealment-of-evidence
lawsuit. Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hospital of Decatur was a spoliation-of-evidence
claim, but the case was remanded for further action without deciding the issue
of damages.' 6'
155. 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 835 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
156. id. at 835-37.
157. 573 So. 2d 24, 27-28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). See also Viviano v. CBS, 597 A.2d 543,
551 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (holding that mere uncertainty in damages will not preclude
plaintiff's cause of action).
158. 938 S.W. 2d 219, 222 (Tex. App. 1997).
159. See. e.g., Federated Mut Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, 456 N.W.2d 434
(Minn. 1990); Baugher v. Gates Rubber Co., 863 S.W.2d 905 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
160. See Rodgers v. SL Mary's Hosp. of Decatur, 556 N.E.2d 913 (111. App. Ct. 1990); Viviano,
597 A.2d 543. See also Capellupo v. FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545, 553 (D. Minn. 1989) (awarding
damages for the expense of having to seek sanctions for spoliation of evidence).
161. 556 N.E.2d 913 (111. App. Ct. 1990). In Rodgers, the plaintiff alleged that the hospital's
failure to preserve the x-rays caused him to lose his case against the radiologist and forced him to
settle with the hospital for less than the judgment amount pending appeal. The plaintiff contended
he should be awarded $400,000-the difference between the judgment award of $1,200,000 and the
settlement amount of $800,000. The basis of his claim was that had the x-rays been preserved, he
would have won against the radiologist and hospital jointly and would have been paid by the
defendants, rather than appealed. Id. at 915.
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In addition to damages resulting from the lost or settled underlying lawsuit,
prejudicial injury can also entail damages such as expenses and delays that result
from the significant interference with the underlying lawsuit. 
6 2
The court in Telectron v. Overhead Door Corp. awarded attorney fees in
addition to compensatory damages."3 Although Telectron involved sanctions
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rather than a spoliation-of-evidence
tort, the court's reasoning is applicable to spoliation-of-evidence tort claims. As
stated by the court, the award of attorney fees is an appropriate "incentive to
parties to investigate and expose misconduct which threatens the integrity of the
discovery process."'64
Punitive damages were awarded in two spoliation-of-evidence cases.""
The court in Viviano stated it was "an apt case for the award of punitive
damages which are intended to punish a tortfeasor and deter him and others from
similar conduct."'"6 In Moskovitz, the court noted a separate cause of action
for spoliation of evidence was not the only remedy. Since the alteration was
intentional on the part of the physician to try to avoid liability in a medical
malpractice claim, the court held punitive damages would be an appropriate
remedy under the circumstances of the case. The court reasoned that if the
162. See Telecron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107, 132 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (stating
the prejudicial injury "derive[dJ both from the irretrievable loss of materials relevant to Telectron's
claims and from the delay, inconvenience and expense suffered by Telectron in investigating the
sources and impact of [the defendant's] document destruction scheme."). Mohawk Mfg. & Supply
Co. v. Lakes Tool Die & Eng'g, Inc., No. 92CI315, 1994 WL 85979 (N.D. Ill. March 14, 1994).
Cf. Pharr v. Cortese, 559 N.YS. 2d 780 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990). In Pharr, the court was not
persuaded by the plaintiff's argument that she had incurred additional damages because defendant's
actions made her medical malpractice case more difficult to prove. The court reasoned the plaintiff
would have spent approximately the same amount of resources regardless of the falsification of
medical records. Pharr, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 781. See also General Envl. Science Corp., 141 F.R.D.
at 454-55 and Capelluo, 126 F.R.D. at 553 (both awarding damages for additional expenses incurred
as the result of having to seek sanctions for spoliation of evidence).
163. 116 F.R.D. 107 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1987).
164. Id. at 135.
165. See Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 597 A.2d 543 (N.J. Super. CL App. Div. 1991) (affirming a jury
award of S215,000 for punitive damages against the defendant for fraudulent concealnent of
evidence); Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 635 N.E.2d 331 (Ohio 1994) (reducing a jury award
for punitive damages from $3 million to $1 million). See also Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage,
718 P.2d 456 n.10 (Alaska 1986) (failing to address the issue of whether plaintiff must prove
compensatory damages before being able to recover punitive damages); Temple Community Hosp.
v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) and Cedar-Sinai Med. Cir. v. Superior
Court, 50 CaI.Rptr. 2d 831 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (both holding spoliation of evidence does not arise
out of medical negligence; therefore, the state's statutory prohibition for punitive damages did not
apply); Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Coulter, 426 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. CL App. 1983) (upholding the use of
evidence of intentional document destruction tojustify awarding punitive damages). But see Anthony
v. Security Pacific Fin. Servs., Inc., 75 F. 3d 311 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that punitive damages are
not allowed under Illinois law since Illinois Supreme Court had not yet recognized intentional
spoliation of evidence as a cause of action,).
166. Viviano, 597 A.2d at 552.
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plaintiff was limited to an action for spoliation of evidence, then she would not
be entitled to any award because no actual damages were caused by the altered
medical records (since the plaintiff was able to finally obtain an unaltered
copy).'67 Likewise, if the injury is limited to the difference between what
would have been won with the evidence and what was won without the evidence,
there is no deterrent to a defendant. It puts the defendant-spoliator in a no-net-
loss situation. If the spoliator destroys the evidence, the most he could be liable
for is the amount he would have been liable for had he not destroyed it. As
such, punitive damages are appropriate in spoliation-of-evidence claims.
7. Spoliation of Evidence by Party to the Lawsuit Versus by Third Party
A final factor the court must consider is whether the spoliator is a party to
the underlying lawsuit or a third party. A party defendant is not obligated to
preserve every document, but he does have a duty to preserve evidence which is
likely to be relevant to a potential lawsuit. 6 The biggest obstacle to overcome
when bringing an action for spoliation of evidence by a third party is proving the
spoliator had a duty to preserve the evidence. As stated in Koplin v. Rosel Well
Perforators, Inc., "absent some special relationship or duty rising by reason of
an agreement, contract, statute, or other special circumstance, the general rule is
that there is no duty to preserve evidence for another to aid that other party in
some future legal action ... ,
a. Party Spoliator
Consistent with the harsher approach courts have taken with intentional
spoliation of evidence, the courts have also looked with disfavor at parties to the
original lawsuit who destroy or alter the evidence for their benefit. Some courts
have imposed harsh sanctions,"0 while others have recognized a spoliation-of-
evidence claim as a viable cause of action.'7' In other cases, the awarding of
damages was used by the courts as a means of deterring the conduct of the party
defendant and compensating the plaintiffs.' Some courts allow a shift of the
burden of proof where the evidence has been intentionally spoliated.,
Another remedy imposed by some courts for the intentional destruction of
167. Moskovitz, 635 N.E.2d at 343-44.
168. See Fire Ins. Exchange v. Zenith Radio Corp., 747 P.2d 911,914 (Nev. 1987); William T.
Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1984). See also
previous discussion of "duty" under Section B, subsection 3 of this comment.
169. 734 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Kan. 1987).
170. See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
171. E.g., Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986) (recognizing a
separate tort for spoliation of evidence where a party intentionally destroyed the evidence).
172. See Section B,' subsection 6 concerning damages in this comment.
173. E.g., Amlan, Inc. v. Detroit Diesel Corp., 651 So. 2d 701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). See
also supra notes 34, 51, 75 and accompanying text.
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evidence is a presumption of negligence sufficient to establish plaintiff's prima
facie case."7 4
All the above cases involved intentional spoliation, but even negligent
spoliation by a party defendant can result in serious consequences.'" Other
courts have recognized the claim for negligent spoliation of evidence under
traditional principles of negligence. 7
b. Third Party Spoliator
When a third party is involved in the spoliation, several factors are
considered by the courts in determining whether the third-party spoliator had a
duty to preserve the evidence."' One such factor is whether the third party
had notice of the pending litigation or the potential for litigation.'7 For
instance, the court in Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co. found a bicycle repairman
who discarded a defective part had no duty to preserve the part because he had
not been notified that the plaintiff was considering bringing a products liability
action against the manufacturer.'79
Another factor in determining whether a duty exists is the foreseeability of
the harm caused to the plaintiff as a result of the spoliation.'" A case which
found the third-party spoliator did not foresee the potential harm caused by the
discarded evidence was Velasco v. Commercial Building Maintenance Co.'
While Velasco involved a negligent spoliation-of-evidence claim, Smith v.
Superior Court' involved an intentional spoliation of evidence by a third
party. The court in Smith concluded that since the third-party spoliator had
promised to preserve the evidence, he had both knowledge of the pending lawsuit
and had foreseeability of the harm. Thus, the third-party spoliator in that case
had a duty to preserve the evidence.'83 However, even where the third party
spoliator had both notice of a pending lawsuit and foreseeability of the harm,
174. See supra notes 34, 51, 75, 92 and infra note 197 and accompanying text.
175. E.g., Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing a cause
of action for negligent spoliation of evidence).
176. See supra notes 49, 98 and accompanying text.
177. See County of Solano v. Delancy, 264 Cal. Rptr. 721, 729 (Cal Ct. App. 1989).
178. Id. at 729.
179. 876 P.2d 415 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
180. County of Solano, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
181. 215 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). The janitor of an office building cleaned off the
plaintiff's attorney's desk, and in the process, threw away a critical piece of evidence. The court
concluded the janitor had no knowledge of the pending lawsuit or of the forcsecability of harm
caused by the destruction of the evidence. Thus, the spoliation-of-evidence claim against the third
party janitor was dismissed because he owed no duty to preserve the evidence under the
circumstances.
182. 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
183. Id. See also Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding
that the third party spoliator, an insurance company, had a contractual duty to preserve the evidence
since it had promised to do so).
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courts may find that a duty to preserve the evidence had ended under the
facts." 4
One type of third-party spoliator who has been the subject of much litigation
is the employer. Most of the cases on point have held an employer does not
have a duty to preserve evidence for use by an employee against a third-party
litigant absent an independent tort, statute, contract, agreement, or special
relationship.' As with any third-party spoliator, the court examines whether
the employer had notice of the potential lawsuit at the time the evidence was
destroyed. The employer will have a duty to preserve the evidence if he had
knowledge of the pending or potential lawsuit.'86 In Weigle, the court recog-
nized a common-law cause of action against the employer for intentionally or
negligently impairing an employee's third-party action. However, the plaintiff
must prove that the employer intended to and did impair the underlying
lawsuit.' And, where there is willful concealment of evidence by the
employer, the court in Viviano v. CBS, Inc. recognized a separate cause of action
for such fraudulent concealment.' " Additionally, several courts held a claim
for spoliation of evidence against an employer is not barred under the workers'
compensation exclusivity rule." 9
The courts have been hesitant to impose harsh remedies against a third-party
spoliator, especially if the spoliator had no interest in the underlying lawsuit.'"
However, the cases that have found a duty on the part of the third party to
preserve the evidence, and then recognized the separate tort of spoliation of
evidence, did so because no other sanction would have been sufficient. 9 ' If
184. Murray v. Farmers Insurance Co., 796 P.2d 101 (Ind. 1990). In Murray, the salvage yard
operator's duty to preserve the evidence ended when a year had passed since he had promised to
preserve the automobile and plaintiff's attorney did not respond to salvage yard's notification that
the automobile would be destroyed unless it received a request for an extension. Id. at 103.
185. See Parker v. Thyssen Mining Constr., Inc., 428 So. 2d 615 (Ala. 1983); Murphy v. Target
Prods., 580 N.E.2d 687 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Panich v. Iron Wood Prods. Corp., 445 N.W.2d 795
(Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc. 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995); Diehl v. Rocky
Mountain Communications, Inc., 818 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. App. 1991). See also General Cinema
Beverages of Miami, Inc. v. Mortimer, 1995 WL 675420 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (imposing a
statutory duty on the employer under state law for claims against a third party); Weigl v. Quincy
Specialties Co., 601 N.Y.S. 2d 774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (recognizing a "common law cause of
action against an employer for negligently or intentionally impairing employee's right to sue third-
party tortfeasor").
186. See Weigle, 601 N.Y.S.2d 774.
187. Id. at 777.
188. 597 A.2d 543 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
189. E.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Court, 286 Cal. Rptr. 855 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991);
Jablonski v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 251 Cal. Rptr. 160 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Carter v. Exide Corp.,
661 So. 2d 698 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995); Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995).
See also infra notes 221, 307 and accompanying text.
190. E.g., Peek v. State Auto Mut. Ins, Co., 661 So. 2d 737 (Ala. 1995).
191. See, e.g., Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (involving an
intentional spoliation by a third party who had no interest in the original lawsuit; the court recognized
a separate cause of action against the third party for intentional spoliation of evidence); Williams v.
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the court were to sanction the wrongdoer by dismissing the underlying claim or
excluding expert testimony, no deterrent would be imposed since the third-party
spoliator has nothing at stake in the lawsuit. Thus, such sanctions would be
inadequate to compensate the injured party." 2
Even though the inadequacies of various sanctions are acknowledged, as
demonstrated with the third-party spoliator, not all courts are embracing the
recognition of this new tort. Therefore, the next section of this comment will
explore other remedies available as an alternative to the recognition of an
independent tort of spoliation of evidence. Those remedies range from the least
severe sanction, an adverse inference that the evidence would have been
unfavorable to the spoliator, to the most severe sanction, dismissal or summary
judgment.
C. Other Remedies Available as an Alternative to Recognition of a Separate
Tort of Spoliation of Evidence
1. Adverse Presumption or Inference and Jury Instruction
As previously discussed .throughout this comment, the most common
sanction imposed for both negligent and intentional spoliation-of-evidenceclaims
is an adverse inference against the spoliator." 3 The jury is instructed that the
evidence destroyed would have been disfavorable to the spoliator. This remedy
is often inadequate since many courts allow any reasonable explanation to rebut
the inference. 9 Such an inference has very little deterrent effect in light
of the tremendous benefit a spoliator can obtain by such destruction,
concealment, or alteration of evidence. To counter the ineffectiveness and
inadequacies of the adverse inference rule, many courts began imposing
severe sanctions such as default or exclusion of expert testimony,195 and
State, 664 P.2d 137 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) and Velasco v. Commercial Building Maintenance Co., 215
Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) are the landmark cases for recognition of negligent spoliation
of evidence by a third party who had no interest in the underlying lawsuit.
192. For further discussion on the inadequacy of other remedies as a deterrent for third party
spoliators, see Maurcie L. Kervin, Comment, Spoliatlon of Evidence: Why Mississippi Should Adopt
The Tort, 63 Miss. St. LJ; 227 (1993).
193. See supra notes 33, 50, 67, 87 and infra notes 197, 208 and accompanying text. See also
Bashir v. Amtrak, 119 F.3d 929 (11th Cir. 1997); Keller v. U.S., 58 F.3d 1194 (7th Cir. 1995);
Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148 (4th Cit. 1995); Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref.
Corp., 72 F.3d 326 (3d Cir. 1995); Donato v. Fitzgibbons, 172 F.R.D. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Shaffer
v. RWP Group, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Rice v. U.S., 917 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1996);
Rodriguez v. Schutt, 896 P.2d 881 (Colo. CL App. 1994), affd in part, rev'd in part, 914 P.2d 921
(1996); Stuart v. State, 907 P. 2d 783 (Idaho 1995); Anderson v. Litzenberg, 694 A.2d 150 (Md. Ct.
App. 1997).
194. See supra note 73 and infra notes 236, 242 and accompanying text.
195. E.g., Fire Ins. Exchange v. Zenith Radio Corp., 747 P.2d 911, 914 (Nev. 1987) (holding
that under Rule 37 the court properly excluded the testimony of plaintiff's expert witness where the
plaintiff destroyed evidence with knowledge of potential litigation. The court stated "[alny adverse
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others recognized spoliation of evidence as an independent cause of
action. '
2. Shifting of Burden of Proof/Presumption of Liability
Another altemativemethodof addressing spoliation ofevidenceis the shifting
of the burden of proof. The shifting of the burden of proof may result in proving
plaintiff's prima facie case or a presumption of liability against the defendant.'97
3. Rules of Civil Procedure9"
Although there is no specific federal statute that governs spoliation of
evidence, many courts have found a remedy in the federal discovery sanctions
under Rules 37(b) and 37(d). One critical limitation to Rule 37, however, is that
it only allows discovery sanctions where there is a violation of a court order.'99
Since Rule 37 would have a limited application upon spoliation-of-evidence
claims, as most do not involve a violation of a court order or the destruction
occurs before a court order can be issued, courts have had to look elsewhere for
the power to impose such sanctions. That power has been found in the court's
"inherent powers doctrine," which permits the court to impose sanctions even
though no court order has been issued.200 As stated in Unigard Security
Insurance Co. v. Lakewood Engineering & Manufacturing Corp., "[c]ourts are
invested with inherent powers that are 'governed not by rule or statute but by the
control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve
the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.' 20' The court further stated
that it had "recognized as part of a district court's inherent powers the 'broad
discretion to make discovery and evidentiary rulings conducive to the conduct of
a fair and orderly trial'.. ..
presumption which the court might have ordered as a sanction for the spoliation of evidence would
have paled next to the testimony of the expert witness.").
196. E.g., Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
197. See supra notes 34, 51, 67, 70, 75, 87, 91, 92, 173, 174 and accompanying text.
198. For more discussion of the application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 and the
court's inherent powers in spoliation-of-evidence cases, see Terry R. Spencer, Comment, Do Not
Fold Spindle Or Mutilate: The Trend Towards Recognition of Spoliation as a Separate Tort, 30
Idaho L. Rev. 37 (1993-1994); Kuppens, supra note 2, Lawrence B. Solum and Stephen J. Marzen,
Comment, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36 Emory L.J.
1085, 1094-1100 (1987).'
199. See. e.g., Uniguard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 367-68
(9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the application of Rule 37 is prohibited where the misconduct does not
result from the violation of a court order).
200. See, e.g., Uniguard Sec. Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 363; Figgie Int'l, Inc. v. Alderman, 698 So. 2d
563 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Patton v. Newmar Corp., 520 N.W.2d 4 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
201. See Uniguard Sec. Ins. Co., 982 F.2d at 368 (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S.
626, 630-31, 82 S. Ct. 1386, 1388-89 (1962)).
202. Id. at 368 (quoting Campbell Indus. v. M/V Gemini, 619 F.2d 24, 27 (9th Cir. 1980)).
1998]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Corresponding state rules of civil procedure provide for sanctions that are
as effective as Federal Rule 37.03 State courts also have inherent powers
similar to federal courts, and thus can apply sanctions through their "inherent
powers doctrine."
Since the court has broad discretion in imposing sanctions, several factors
are considered in determining the appropriate sanction. The following factors
should be examined to determine if a sanction is appropriate and what type of
sanction is warranted:
(1) the degree of fault of the party who altered or destroyed the
evidence; (2) the degree of prejudice suffered by the opposing party;
and (3) whether there is a lesser sanction that will avoid substantial
unfairness to the opposing party and, where the offending party is
seriously at fault, will serve to deter such conduct by others in the
future.
20 4
Where the sanctions are imposed under the court's inherent powers doctrine, the
"standard by which to test the impact of the spoliation [is] the prejudice to the
opposing party, ' O': s "Implicit in that standard is the need to examine the nature
of the item lost in the context of the claims asserted and the potential for
remediation of the prejudice. 22 Once a sanction is imposed by the court, it
will be overturned on appeal only upon a showing of abuse of discretion.0 7
Sanctions imposed under Rule 37 (and analogous state rules) and the
inherent powers doctrine can range in severity from granting an adverse
presumption08 to excluding expert testimony. 09 The most severe sanctions,
203. See generally Federated Mut Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, Inc., 456
N.W.2d 434, 437 (Minn. 1990).
204. Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76,79 (3d Cir. 1994). See also Santarelli
v. BP America, 913 F. Supp. 324 (M.D. Pa. 1996).
205. See Patton v. Newmar Corp., 538 N.W.2d 116, 118 (Minn. 1995); Dillan v. Nissan Motor
Co., Ltd., 986 F.2d 263, 267 (8th Cir. 1993).
206. Id.
207. E.g., Pattton, 538 N.W.2d 116; Shimanovsky v. General Motors Corp., 648 N.E. 2d 91 (111.
App. CL 1995) (reversing the trial court for abuse of discretion in dismissing plaintiff's claim as a
sanction without considering whether the spoliation resulted in prejudice to the manufacturer);
Bachmeier v. Wallwork Truck Ctrs., 544 N.W.2d 122 (N.D. 1996). Note: Shimanovsky is a
destructive testing case. Sampson v. Marshall Brass Co., 661 A.2d 971 (R.I. 1995) (remanding the
case for determination as to the reason the plaintiffcould not produce the missing evidence; without
such a determination, the drastic sanction of dismissal is inappropriate). See also Thurman-Bryant
Elec. Supply Co. v. Unisys Corp., No. 03A01-CV00152, 1991 WL 222256, at 05 (Tenn. App. Nov.
4, 1991) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion in granting summary judgment as a
sanction for negligent spoliation of evidence by plaintiff's attorney and plaintiff's agent).
. 208. See, e.g., Kershaw County Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 396 S.E.2d 369
(S.C. 1990). See also supra notes 33, 50, 67, 75, 87, 193.
209. See, e.g., Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co., 986 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1993) (excluding the
testimony of plaintiffs expert based on the court's inherent powers where the plaintiff did not act
in bad faith, but merely failed to preserve evidence); Uniguard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng'g &
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however, have been imposed where there was intentional spoliation of evidence
by a party to the original suit. In such a situation, dismissal of the lawsuit,
default judgment, or summary judgment may be granted.1 Some courts have
Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the court's inherent powers were properly
used to exclude the testimony of plaintiff's expert where plaintiff destroyed the evidence but did not
do so in bad faith); Northern Assurance Co. v. Ware, 145 F.R.D. 281 (D. Maine 1993); Chapman
v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 469 S.E.2d 783 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (reversing the trial court's jury
instruction on rebuttable presumption and remanding for the trial court to determine whether
dismissal of the case or the exclusion of expert testimony is warranted); Carbone v. Checker Taxi
Co., No. 90-7707E, 1994 WL 878883 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 1994); Hamann v. Ridge Tool Co.,
539 N.W.2d 753 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (limiting a plaintiff's expert testimony where another
plaintiff's expert inadvertently lost'evidence); Patton v. Newmar Corp., 538 N.W.2d 116 (Minn.
1995) (reversing the appellate court and reinstating the trial court's exclusion of plaintiff's expert
witness, which resulted in summary judgment being granted in favor of defendant); Himes v.
Woodkings-Verona Tool Works, Inc., 565 N.W.2d 469 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (excluding expert
testimony where evidence was accidently lost); Fire Ins. Exchange v. Zenith Radio Corp., 747 P.2d
911, 914 (Nev. 1987) (holding that under Rule 37 the court properly excluded the testimony of
plaintiff's expert witness where the plaintiff destroyed evidence with knowledge of potential
litigation. The court stated "[alny adverse presumption which the court might have ordered as a
sanction for the spoliation of evidence would have paled next to the testimony of the expert
witness."). Cf. Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 80-81 (3d Cir. 1994) (reversing
the district court's exclusion of expert testimony where plaintiff's expert unintentionally altered the
defective product during testing procedures. The court held the plaintiff's expert did not have "an
affirmative duty not to conduct an investigation without affording all potential defendants an
opportunity to have an expert present" prior to any suit having been filed.); Mayes v. Black &
Decker, 931 F. Supp. 80 (D.N.H. 1996) (denying manufacturer's motion for exclusion of expert
testimony as a sanction where the destroyed evidence did not significantly prejudice the defendant).
210. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 53 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming
dismissal of products liability claim); Moyers v. Ford Motor Co., 941 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(granting summary judgment and stating that any lesser sanction would be inadequate since the
manufacturer was severely prejudiced); Garcia v. Sunbeam Corp., No. 92C4897, 1995 WL 794567
(N.D. II1. Jan. 31, 1995) (dismissing plaintiff's products liability claim despite the fact that their
insurance company, and not them, disposed of the evidence; the court held plaintiffs had a duty to
preserve the evidence); Thiele v. Oddy's Auto and Marine, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 158 (W.D.N.Y. 1995);
Candy v. Resolution Trust Corp., No. Civ.A.94-2786, 1995 WL 334309 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 1995)
(granting summary judgment where plaintiff fails to produce evidence); Voelkel v. General Motors
Corp., 846 F. Supp. 1468 (D. Kan. 1994) (granting summary judgment where the plaintiff's
attorney's assistant destroyed the evidence before defendant's expert examined it); Schwartz v.
Subaru of America, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (granting summary judgment for
automobile company where plaintiff intentionally destroyed the automobile after plaintiff's expert had
inspected it but prior to filing suit); Smith v. American Honda Motor Co., 846 F. Supp. 1217 (M.D.
Pa. 1994) (granting summary judgment where plaintiff intentionally destroyed evidence before
defendant's expert had examined it); Jeanblanc v. Oliver Carr Co., No. 91-01-0128, 1992 WL 189434
(D.D.C. July 24, 1992) No. 91-0128(JHG) (dismissing a portion of plaintiffs claim where the
plaintiff intentionally destroyed evidence); Lee v. Boyle-Midway Household Prods., 792 F. Supp.
1001 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (granting'summary judgment where plaintiff lost the evidence thereby
prejudicing defendant);'Brancaccio v. Mitsubishi Motors Co., Inc., No. 90 Civ. 78521, 1992 WL
189937 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1992) (dismissing plaintiff's claim under federal rule 37(d)); General
Env't Science Corp. v. Horsfall, 141 F.R.D. 443, 452 (N.D. Ohio 1992) (stating that where defendant
intentionally destroys discoverable evidence, "[n]o lesser sanction than default judgment will suffice.
Imposition of a lesser sanction would only reward defendants for their misconduct."); Sponco Mfg.,
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held that default judgment, summary judgment, or dismissal of the lawsuit is
inappropriate where the party spoliator only negligently destroys or fails to
preserve the evidence.2"' No per-se rule exists granting dismissal, default, or
summary judgment; rather, the sanction imposed must correlate to the culpability
of the party against whom the sanction is being imposed and the prejudice
resulting to the opposing party.' 12
In addition to discovery sanctions, some courts have also awarded damages
for reasonable expenses in litigating the spoliation-of-evidence claim under Rule
37.23
Inc. v. Alcover, 656 So. 2d 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming default on issue of liability
despite no willful destruction of evidence where plaintiff could not proceed with his products liability
claim without the destroyed evidence); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 559 So. 2d 102,
103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that sanction of striking party's pleadings may be warranted
where the party to the original lawsuit intentionally destroys relevant documents essential to
opponent's defense); Stubli v. Big D Int'l Trucks, 810 P.2d 785, 788 (Nev. 1991) (dismissing
plaintiff's lawsuit where plaintiff's attorney and expert willfully lost evidence); Bachmeier v.
Wallwork Truck Ctrs., 544 N.W.2d 122 (N.D. 1996) (affirming the granting of summary judgment
under the court's inherent power to sanction where spoliation was not malicious; the court found the
destruction of the evidence severely prejudiced manufacturer from defending the claim by not being
able to inspect the product); Cole v. Keller Indus., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 1470 (E.D. Va. 1994) (granting
motion to dismiss as sanction for plaintiff's expert's destructive testing of crucial evidence).
211. See Townsend v. American Insulated Panel Co., Inc., 174 F.R.D. I (D. Mass. 1997)
(denying motion for summary judgment where plaintiffdid not possess control over evidence); Mayes
v. Black & Decker, 931 F. Supp. 80 (D.N.H. 1996) (denying manufacturer's motion to dismiss where
no willfulness or malicious spoliation was shown); Santarelli v. BP America, 913 F. Supp. 324 (M.D.
Pa. 1996); Gordner v. Dynetics Corp., 862 F. Supp. 1303 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (holding summary
judgment inappropriate as sanction where plaintiff's conduct did not cause the destruction of
evidence); Martin v. Intex Recreational Corp., 858 F. Supp. 161 (D. Kan. 1994); Cassity v. Atchison,
Topeka & Sante Fe Railway Co., No. 91-2153-0, 1992 WL 88018 (D. Kan. March 18, 1992); Cole
v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., No. CV93-0344232, 1994 WL 728636 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec.
28, 1994) (holding summary judgment is an inappropriate sanction for spoliation of evidence); Patton
v. Newmar Corp., 520 N.W.2d 4 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Transamerica Ins. Group v. Maytag, Inc.,
650 N.E.2d 169 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (reversing the trial court's dismissal where the evidence was
not under the insurance company's control at the time the destruction occurred; rather, a less severe
sanction was appropriate under the facts of the case); Sampson v. Marshall Brass Co., 661 A.2d 971
(R.I. 1995) (remanding the case for determination as to reason plaintiff could not produce the missing
evidence; without such a determination, drastic sanction of dismissal is inappropriate); and Thurman-
Bryant Electric Supply Co. v. Unisys Corp., No. 03A01-CVOO152, 1991 WL 222256 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Nov. 4, 1991) (each holding that the trial court abused its discretion in granting summary judgment
as a sanction for negligent spoliation of evidence). See also Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door
Corp.,116 F.R.D. 107, 131 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (holding that before a defaultjudgment may be entered,
the court must find that the defendant acted "willfully or in bad faith" and that "[nlo lesser sanctions
would not serve the punishment-and-deterrence goals .. "); Shultz v. Barko Hydraulics, Inc., 832
F. Supp. 142, 146 (W.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that before a summary judgment should be granted
against the party who lost the evidence, "the moving party must first show either that the party who
lost the evidence did so fraudulently or intentionally, or that the absence of the evidence unduly
prejudices the moving party to such an extent that preparation of its case is rendered impossible.").
212. Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F. 3d 76 (3d Cir. 1994); Tabacco v. Spray
Prods. Corp., No. 93-4961, 1994 WL 683379 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 1994).
213. See, e.g., General Envtl. Science Corp. v. Horsfall, 141 F.R.D. 443, 454-55 (N.D. Cal.
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None of the cases discussing federal and state discovery sanctions have
adopted a separate tort of spoliation of evidence. This may be because the
injured party chose to seek such sanctions rather than to seek a separate
spoliation-of-evidence tort cause of action."' In the end, such sanctions can
be very severe and crippling to the spoliator. If the court imposes such severe
sanctions, those sanctions have a greater deterrent effect and more justly
compensate the injured party than an adverse presumption against the spoliator.
4. Criminal Statutes
The primary criminal statutes that can be used to remedy spoliation-of-
evidence claims are the federal and state obstruction-of-justice statutes. 215 Such
statutes, however, are severely limited in practical application for civil lawsuits
since most obstruction-of-justice statutes require the destroyed evidence to be
relevant to a "criminal proceeding or investigation." 21 6  Also, negligent
spoliation of evidence "falls outside the scope of such statutes" because the
statutes require an intentional act.2
1
Another criminal statute that may be useful in limited circumstances is
contempt-of-court statutes. However, usually there must be some type of
violation of a court order for the court to hold the spoliator in contempt."'
5. Code of Professional Responsibility for Attorneys
Attorneys have been the spoliator in several cases discussed in this
comment."1 9 Those cases focused on finding a remedy that should be imposed
to compensate the injured party, specifically the recognition of spoliation of
evidence as a separate tort or discovery sanctions. However, the court in
Federated Mutual Insurance Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, Inc. did
allude to the fact that attorneys may also be subject to state professional
disciplinary action.220
1992); Capelluo v. FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545, 553 (D. Minn. 1989).
214. The only case where a separate cause of action was plead, but expressly rejected by the
court in favor of sanctions, is Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267 (111. 995).
215. See, e.g., Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 834-45 (Cal. CL App. 1984)
(rejecting the argument that obstruction-of-justice statutes preempted the cause of action for spoliation
ofevidence); Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434,437
(Minn. 1990); Patton, 520 N.W.2d at 7 n.i.
216. See Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 835. See also Solum and Marzen, supra note 198, at 1106-13.
217. See Kerkorian, supra note 115, at 1090.
218. For more discussion on applicable criminal statutes, see Solum and Marzen, supra note 198,
at 1113-24.
219. See, e.g., Murray v. Farmers Ins. Co., 796 P.2d 101 (Idaho 1990); Federated Mut. Ins. Co.,
456 N.W.2d 434; Stubli v. Big D Int'l Trucks, 810 P.2d 785 (Nev. 1991).
220. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 456 N.W.2d at 437. For a more thorough discussion of legal
malpractice and disciplinary sanctions, see, Solum and Marzen, supra note 198, at 1124-37 and
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D. Statute of Limitations and Other Procedural Issues
Procedural requirements for a spoliation-of-evidehce cause of action are not
well-defined in the jurisprudence since it is a developing area of law. One
procedural issue which has been addressed by the courts is whether a spoliation-
of-evidence claim arises out of, or is directly related to, the underlying area of
law. The courts have routinely held it does not. For instance, where the
spoliator is the plaintiff's employer, the spoliation-of-evidence claim is not barred
by the workers' compensation exclusivity rule since the prejudicial injury does
not proximately arise out of plaintiff's employment."' Likewise, a healthcare
provider who destroys or alters medical evidence is not protected under the
medical malpractice or professional negligence statutes since the spoliation claim
is not directly related to the professional services.222
Another procedural issue in this developing area of law is what statute of
limitations governs a spoliation-of-evidence claim. The few courts which have
visited the issue of statute of limitations have given various rulings.2 ' One of
the first courts to recognize the cause of action as a separate tort also had to
address the issue of a statute of limitations for a spoliation-of-evidence claim.
In Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed
the trial court's application of the "discovery rule."22' The court rejected
defendants' argument that the "statute of limitations began to run when the tort
was completed"; i.e., when the spoliation was completed. Rather, the difficulty
in discovering the destruction or alteration of evidence warranted the application
Kerkorian, supra note 115.
221. E.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Court, 286 Cal. Rptr. 855 (Cal. CL App. 1991)
(holding that employee's claim for negligent spoliation of evidence is not barred by workers'
compensation exclusivity rule); Jablonski v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 251 Cal. Rplr. 160 (Cal. CL App.
1988) (holding that employee's claim for intentional spoliation of evidence is not barred by workers'
compensation exclusivity rule); Carter v. Exide Corp., 661 So. 2d 698 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995);
Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995). See also supra note 189 and infra note
307 and accompanying text.
222. Temple Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) and
Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 831 (Cal Ct. App. 1996) (each holding
that the claim for intentional spoliation of evidence is not directly related to the medical services
provided; i.e., it does not arise out of the professional negligence).
223. See Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986) (affirming the trial
court's application of the "discovery rule"); Augusta v. United Service Auto. Assn., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d
400 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the cause of action for spoliation of evidence was subject to
the two-year statute of limitations under California law because it involved an infringement of a
"property right," not a "personal right"); Weigl v. Quincy Specialties Co., 601 N.Y.S.2d 774, 778
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (stating in dicta "if plaintiff asserts a claim grounded in negligence, the statute
of limitations of three years" under the law of New York and holding that the statute of limitations
do not require plaintiff to assert a cause of action prior to plaintiff having knowledge of the
spoliation); Harrison v. Davis, 478 S.E.2d 104 (W. Va. 1996) (holding the spoliation-of-evidence
claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury and wrongful death claims
under the laws of West Virginia).
224. 718 P.2d 456 (Alrska 1986).
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of the discovery rule. The statute of limitations did not begin to run until the
aggrieved party discovered or reasonably should have discovered the spoliation
of the evidence.22s Under Hazen, the plaintiff must bring the claim within two
years of discovery of the spoliation. Thus, the court applied the two year statute
of limitations under Alaska law for an injury to "person or rights." '26 Those
courts which view the claim as one for infringement of, or interference with, a
property right logically follow that the statute of limitations governing property
rights also governs a claim for spoliation of evidence. 27 In contrast, the court
in Harrison v. Davis held the spoliation-of-evidence claim was barred by the
state's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury and wrongful death
claims.2 ' The court's somewhat flawed opinion might be explained by the
court's finding that plaintiff suffered no prejudicial injury. Since plaintiff was
able to bring her medical malpractice and wrongful death claims, the court
opined that the defendant's non-production of the fetal monitor strips did not
impair plaintiff's underlying cause of action. 29 What the court failed to
consider is that the ability to file a lawsuit and to win a lawsuit are two entirely
different matters. Plaintiff's spoliation-of-evidence claim was based on the
premise of interference with her right to have an opportunity to win the
underlying claim, not on her ability to merely file the personal injury and
wrongful death claims.
III. APPLICABILITY OF LOUISIANA LAW
A. History of Louisiana Law on Spoliation of Evidence
1. Adverse Presumption For Failure to Produce Evidence
Louisiana has a long legal history of allowing an adverse presumption
against the party who fails to produce evidence which it has in its control. The
adverse presumption doctrine began with Navarette v. Laughlin, a 1946 Louisiana
Supreme Court decision, where an intervenor failed to produce a hotel register
it contended would rebut testimony as to decedent's residence230 Since the
intervenor did not prove the register was lost or destroyed, a presumption was
225. Id. at 464. See also infra notes 312-314 and accompanying text.
226. Hazen, 718 P.2d at 464.
227. Id. (affirming the trial court's application of the two-year statute of limitations and the
"discovery rule" under the statute governing injury to property rights); Augusta, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 400
(holding that the cause of action for spoliation of evidence was subject to the two-year statute of
limitations under California law because it involved an infringement of a "property right", not a
"personal right"). Q
. 
Harrison v. Davis, 478 S.E.2d 104 (W. Va. 1996) (holding the spoliation-of-
evidence claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury and wrongful death
claims under the laws of West Virginia).
228. 478 S.E.2d 104 (W. Va. 1996).
229. Id. at 117.
230. 209 La. 417, 24 So. 2d 672 (La. 1946).
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held against the intervenor that the decedent's testimony was correct.23 1
Following Navarette, numerous Louisiana courts applied the adverse presumption
rule against the party who failed to produce evidence within its control.
3 2
2. Adverse Presumption Against Spoliator
In 1975, Louisiana extended the adverse presumption rule to apply to a party
who had spoliated evidence. 33 . In one of the first cases to discuss destruction
of evidence by a party defendant, Miller v. Montgomery Ward & Co., the court
held an adverse inference against the spoliator was not applicable under the facts
since the defendant did not have a duty to preserve the evidence. 3  Since
Miller, Louisiana courts have applied the adverse inference or presumption
against a spoliator in only three cases.23
3. Adverse Presumption Not Applicable if Reasonable Explanation Given
Not long after the courts allowed an adverse presumption, they reduced its
effectiveness by allowing a reasonable explanation of the failure to produce
231. Id.
232. See, e.g., Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Odom Offshore Surveys, Inc., 697 F.
Supp. 921 (E.D. La. 1988), affid, 889 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1989); Texas & N.O. Railroad Co. v.
Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 242 La. 349, 136 So. 2d 382 (La. 1962); Martin v. T.L. James & Co.,
237 La. 633, 112 So. 2d 86 (La. 1959); Williams v. Golden, 699 So. 2d 102 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1997); Cooper v. Diamond Offshore Drilling, Inc., 692 So. 2d 1213 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1997); Salone
v. Jefferson Parish Dept. of Water, 645 So. 2d 747 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1994); Alexander v. LaGrange,
509 So. 2d 540 n.7 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987). But see Johnson v. Department of Pub. Safety, 627 So.
2d 732 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993); Bourgeois v. Bill Watson's Investments, Inc., 458 So. 2d 167 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1984); Beaucoudray v. Hirsch, 49 So. 2d 770 (La. App. Orl. 1951) (each finding a
sufficient explanation for failing to produce the evidence; therefore, adverse inference not applicable).
233. See Miller v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 317 So. 2d 278 (La. App. I st Cir. 1975). See also
Vick v. Texas Employment Commission, 514 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding an adverse inference
applicable only where destruction of evidence was done in bad faith) and Kammerer v. Sewerage and
Water Bd. of New Orleans, 633 So. 2d 1357, 1365 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994) (concurring opinion
stating that the adverse inference rule is both compensatory and punitive).
234. Id.
235. See Rodriguez v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 1237 (La. 1978) (holding that an
adverse presumption is applicable since there was a lack of explanation on the part of the spoliator);
Salone v. Jefferson Parish Dept. of Water, 645 So. 2d 747 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1994) (applying the
adverse presumption where no reasonable explanation was offered on the part of the spoliator;
defendant merely stated he did not know where the evidence was and could not find it); McElroy v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 420 So. 2d 214 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982) (holding that an adverse presumption would
be allowed where the spoliator's explanation was unsatisfactory). See also Gordon v. State Farm Ins.
Co., 700 So. 2d 1117 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1997) (affirming that plaintifrs explanation for failing to
produce evidence was insufficient to overcome adverse presumption); Williams v. Golden, 699 So.
2d 102 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1997) (holding that lack of explanation for failing to produce medical
records within defendant's control resulted in imposition of adverse inference); Cooper v. Diamond
Offshore Drilling, Inc., 692 So. 2d 1213 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1997) (finding an unexplained failure to
produce evidence within defendant's control resulted in imposition of adverse inference).
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evidence or of the spoliation of the evidence to make the presumption inapplica-
ble." 6 The court in Rodriguez v. Northwestern National Insurance Co. stated
that the "the trial judge reasonably could have inferred that the insurer's
unexplained failure to present evidence on this issue was due to the fact that it
would have been harmful to its defense.",
237
The seminal case in Louisiana that allowed a reasonable explanation to make
the adverse presumption against a spoliator inapplicable is Babineaux v.
Black." s The case involved a "marsh buggy" with mechanical problems. The
defendant installed a new engine in the buggy and discarded the old engine. The
third-party manufacturer alleged that destruction of the original engine prohibited
it from proving the engine was not defective when it left its control, and
therefore, an adverse presumption against the spoliator should have been
imposed. The defendant claimed it did not have any notice of potential litigation
when it discarded the engine, and it had discarded the engine because it assumed
the problem was resolved when the second engine was installed. The court
found the defendant's explanation satisfactory and no presumption was
imposed.2
39
Until recently, Louisiana courts had found a "reasonable" explanation for
every spoliation-of-evidence claim except one.2"' The court in McElroy v.
Allstate Ins. Co. sympathized with the plaintiff, a widow, for selling the vehicle
in which her husband died, but found her explanation unsatisfactory to rebut the
adverse presumption.24' Then in 1994, the tide began to turn and a number of
recent cases involving spoliation of evidence or failure to produce evidence
within a party's control affirmed the imposition of the adverse inference rule and
tightened the definition of "reasonable explanation. 242
236. E.g., Boh Bros. Const. Co., Inc. v. Luber-Finer, Inc., 612 So. 2d 270 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1992); Bourgeois v. Bill Watson's Invs., Inc., 458 So. 2d 167 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984); Babineaux
v. Black, 396 So. 2d 584 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
237. 358 So. 2d 1237, 1242 (La. 1978) (emphasis added).
238. 396 So. 2d 584 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
239. Id. at 585-86.
240. For cases which found an explanation made the adverse presumption inapplicable to a
spoliator ofevidence, see Johnson v. Dept. of Public Safety, 627 So, 2d 732 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993);
Boh Bros. Constr. Co., Inc. v. Luber-Finer, Inc., 612 So. 2d 270 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993);
Bourgeois, 458 So. 2d 167; Beaucoudray v. Hirsch, 49 So. 2d 770 (La. App. Orl. 1951).
241. 420 So. 2d 214 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982). The court affirmed the trial court's jury charge
regarding the adverse presumption that the evidence would have been disfavorable to the widow-
spoliator. In doing so, the court considered the fact that the jury instruction was not unduly
influential because the plaintiff had explained her reason for destruction of the car and because the
presumption did not result in "prima facie evidence of no negligence on the part of [the manufactur-
er]." Id. at 216.
242. See Gordon v. State Farm Ins. Co., 700 So. 2d 1117 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1997) (finding
plaintiff's explanation insufficient to overcome adverse presumption); Salone v. Jefferson Parish
Dept. of Water, 645 So. 2d 747 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1994) (finding that the defendant did not offer
a reasonable explanation for the missing evidence). See also Williams v. Golden, 699 So. 2d 102
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1997) (holding that lack of explanation for failing to produce medical records
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Thus, the threat of an adverse inference against the spoliator under Louisiana
law is hardly a threat at all. The courts have been very lenient in the past as to
what is a "reasonable" explanation for the missing evidence. Moreover, no
Louisiana court has held that spoliation of evidence results in a shifting of the
burden of proof or a presumption of negligence against the spoliator. In fact, the
court in McElroy implied that a jury instruction that spoliation of evidence by
plaintiff results in a prima facie case of no liability for defendants would have
been unduly influential, and thus reversible error. 4 Also, where no intentional
destruction of evidence was shown, two Louisiana courts refused to impose a
presumption of liability against the spoliator.2" Likewise, in Williams v.
Golden, only an adverse inference was imposed, rather than a presumption of
negligence. 4 The only recent Louisiana court that did impose a harsh remedy
for failing to produce evidence was Williams v. General Motors Corp. (Williams
1).246 In its opinion on a grant of rehearing, the court held that the failure to
produce evidence "reflects on the quality of the expert testimony."24 Under
the facts of the case, the court found plaintiff's expert's testimony inadmissi-
ble.2 48
within defendant's control resulted in imposition of adverse inference); Cooper v. Diamond
Offshore Drilling, Inc., 692 So. 2d 1213 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1997) (finding an unexplained
failure to produce evidence within defendant's control resulted in imposition of adverse
inference). But see Constans v. Chowtaw Transport, Inc., Nos. 97-CA-0863, 97-CA-0864,
1997 WL 790514 (La. App. 4th Cir. Dec. 23, 1997) (unpublished opinion) and Morehead
v. Ford Motor Co., 694 So. 2d 650 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1997) (both finding a reasonable
explanation existed for failure to preserve evidence); Nicoli v. LoCoco, 701 So. 2d 1062 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1997) (dismissing spoliation-of-evidence claim where defendant denied that the
evidence ever existed); Randolph v. General Motors Corp., 646 So. 2d 1019 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994)
(reversing the trial court and finding the defendant's explanation was sufficient even though no
precise explanation could be given). See also In Re Hopson Marine Transport, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 560
(E.D. La. 1996) (holding adverse inference inapplicable where there was no wrongful discovery
denial).
243. McElroy, 420 So. 2d at 216.
244. Gordon, 700 So. 2d 1117; Randolph, 646 So. 2d 1019 (reversing the trial court's
imposition of liability where there was no intentional spoliation of evidence).
245. 699 So. 2d 102, 108 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1997). Cf Welsh v. U.S., 844 F.2d 1239(6th Cir. 1988) (ruling that negligent destruction of evidence in medical malpractice claim
warrants rebuttable presumption of negligence and causation); May v. Moore, 424 So. 2d 596,
603 (Ala. 1982) (holding that spoliation or suppression of medical records results is
"sufficient foundation for an inference of his guilt or negligence"); Public Health Trust of
Dade County v. Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596, 599 (Fla. 1987) (holding that destruction of medical
records results in a rebuttable presumption of negligence even though no bad faith or
deliberate acts were shown).
246. 639 So. 2d 275 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994).
247. Id. at 290.
248. Id. Note: This opinion may be explained by the court's finding that the expert's testimony
was not admissible under the standard set forth by the Supreme Court for expert testimony in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
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4. Bad Faith Requirement for Adverse Presumption
In all of the adverse presumption cases discussed, no requirement of bad
faith on the part of the spoliator is mentioned. However, a recent decision,
Kammerer v. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans,49 held that since
there was no bad faith on the part of the defendant spoliator, no adverse
presumption should apply." ° Although there is little support for that proposi-
tion in the Louisiana jurisprudence,2"' many other states do require a fraudu-
lent, willful, or bad faith element before an adverse presumption will be given
in an intentional spoliation-of-evidence cause of action. 52 On the other hand,
common law states are divided as to whether bad faith is required for a negligent
spoliation-of-evidence cause of action to be recognized."'
B. Growing Recognition of Spoliation of Evidence in Louisiana
1. Cases Finding an Impairment of a Civil Claim
Louisiana has recognized a cause of action for "impairment of a civil
claim."25 4 One could argue that spoliation of evidence is one such form of
impairment, and thus should also be recognized as a separate tort in Louisiana.
There are similarities between the two causes of action. 255 Both causes of
action are based on the premise that a plaintiff has the right to be free from
interference in pursuing his or her lawsuit."6
249. 633 So. 2d 1357 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994).
250. Id. See also Randolph v. General Motors, Inc., 646 So. 2d 1019, 1027 (La. App. Ist Cir.
1994) (citing Kammerer). But see infra notes 299, 300 and accompanying text (criticizing the bad
faith requirement).
251. The only Louisiana case which might be cited as supporting the proposition that bad faith
is required would be Lewis v. Darce Towing Co., 94 F.R.D. 262 (W.D. La. 1982). But even Lewis
is limited in its holding since bad faith was merely one of several factors the court examined when
determining whether to exclude evidence. Id. at 267. In addition, there was a United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit case, Vick v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 514 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.
1975), which held bad faith was-required for the adverse presumption to be applicable.
252. See supra note 65, 70 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 89, 90 and accompanying text.
254. See, e.g., Duhe v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 1414 (E.D. La. 1986); Bethea v.
Modem Biomedical Servs., Inc., No. 97-332, 1997 WL 728565 (La. App. 3d Cir. Nov. 19, 1997)
(unpublished opinion); Morgan v. ABC Mfr., 637 So. 2d 1076 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1994); Williams
v. General Motors Corp., 607 So. 2d 695 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992); Fischer v. Travelers Ins. Co., 429
So. 2d 538 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
255. See, e.g., Bethea, 1997 WL 728565, at *1 (unpublished opinion) where the plaintiff pled
both -spoliation of evidence and an impairment of a civil claim in her amending and supplemental
petitions for damages.
256. See Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, 456 N.W.2d 434, 437
(Minn. 1990) (stating that "[tlhe rationale for this new tort (spoliation of evidence] is that a potential
civil action is deemed an interest worthy of legal protection from undue interference").
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As with a spoliation-of-evidence claim, a plaintiff in an impairment-of-a-
civil-action claim must prove the defendant had a duty to preserve the evi-
dence.2S7 Fischer v. Travelers Insurance Co.251 involved a department policy
that required the investigating police officer to complete a written report for each
automobile accident. The failure of the police officer to complete such a report
was a breach of duty which caused the plaintiff to "lose the opportunity to
pursue the claim against the other driver. ' 9 Thus, the court granted recovery
against the defendant for the stipulated amount of $35,000."o
Duhe v. Delta Air Lines26 also involved a breach of a statutory duty. The
court in Duhe found an airline had breach its duty when it obstructed the arrest
of a passenger. Since the obstruction may have caused the plaintiff to "lose the
opportunity to pursue her claim against her assailant," the court denied
defendant's motion dismissing the case for failure to state a cause of action.262
In contrast, the court in Morgan v. ABC Manufacturer63 found plaintiff's
petition failed to adequately state a claim against the employer's workers'
compensation insurance adjuster for impairment of a civil claim where no duty
was alleged on the face of the petition for damages. However, the court allowed
plaintiff an opportunity to amend his petition to set forth more definitive
allegations of a duty on the part of the adjuster to preserve the evidence. 2" In
Morgan, no workers' compensation benefits had been sought. The court implied
that had such benefits been sought, the workers' compensation adjuster would
have had a duty to investigate the accident and preserve the evidence.265
Otherwise, plaintiff must show the claims adjuster assumed the duty.2"
257. See Duhe v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 1414 (E.D. La. 1986); Morgan v. ABC
Mfr., 637 So. 2d 1076 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1994); Williams v. General Motors Corp., 607 So. 2d 695,
697 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992); Fischer v. Travelers Ins. Co., 429 So. 2d 538 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
258. 429 So. 2d 538 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
259. Id. at 540.
260. Id. at 541.
261. 635 F. Supp. 1414 (E.D. La. 1986).
262. Id. at 1416-17.
263. 637 So. 2d 1076, 1078-79 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1994).
264. Id. at 1079.
265. Id. at 1078. This reasoning is in line with General Cinema Beverages of Miami, Inc. v.
Mortimer, 689 So. 2d 276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) finding a statutory duty under Florida's
workers' compensation laws. See supra note 185 and infra note 308 and accompanying text. But
see Randolph v. General Motors, Inc., 646 So. 2d 1019 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1994), where no actual
payment of workers' compensation benefits or assumption of duty was required by the court.
Although the appellate court disagreed with the trial court's finding of foreseeability ofa lawsuit, it
did not reverse on the basis of no duty on the part of the employer to preserve the evidence. Rather,
it only reversed the tial court's imposition of liability on the parish because there was no intentional
destruction.
266. Morgan, 637 So. 2d at 1078-79. See also Carter v. Exide. Corp., 661 So. 2d 698, 705 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1995) (allowing plaintiff to amend his petition for damages to particularly plead
allegations of employer's duty to preserve the evidence); Randolph, 646 So. 2d at 1027 (discussing
the foreseeabiliy or expectation of an employer that an employee would bring a lawsuit which would
impose a duty on the employer to preserve the evidence).
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In an impairment-of-a-civil-claim action, the plaintiff must prove "the loss
of plaintiff's opportunity to pursue the claim." '' This level of proof can be
compared to that required by a Florida court in Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co. for a
spoliation-of-evidence cause of action. 6 ' In Miller, the court only required the
plaintiff to "show that defendant's interference cost her an opportunity to prove
her [underlying] lawsuit." ' 9
2. Recent Cases Involving Spoliation of Evidence
In 1982, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana was confronted with the issue of concealment of evidence under the
federal rules of discovery in Lewis v. Darce Towing Co.2" Lewis involved the
intentional concealment of evidence by plaintiff and her attorney regarding an
autopsy that was performed on her deceased spouse. The court sanctioned the
plaintiff under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 37 by excluding
plaintiff's expert's testimony. The court stated bad faith and the potential for
abuse on the part of the plaintiff warranted such a sanction.7 It should be
noted, however, the court did not state bad faith was required for the sanction to
be applied. Rather, the court took into consideration bad faith as one of several
factors in deciding whether to exclude the evidence.2"
The first case applying Louisiana law to discuss spoliation of evidence was
Edwards v. Louisville Ladder Co.273  In Edwards, the plaintiff brought a
spoliation-of-evidence claim against his employer for failure to preserve a ladder,
which was a critical piece of evidence in a products liability lawsuit against the
manufacturer. The court held the employer did not have a duty to preserve the
evidence since there was no agreement, special relationship, or statutory
duty. " Edwards is consistent with other cases involving spoliation by a third
party; i.e., generally there is no duty on the part of an employer to preserve
evidence for an employee's third-party action unless the employer had notice of
the potential lawsuit.2"
267. Duhe v. Delta Air Lines, 635 F. Supp. 1414, 1416 (E.D. La. 1986); Williams v. General
Motors Corp., 607 So. 2d 695, 697 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992); Fischer v. Travelers Ins. Co., 429 So.
2d 538, 540 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).
268. 573 So. 2d 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
269. Id. at 31 (emphasis added). See also supra notes 150-152 and accompanying text.
270. 94 F.R.D. 262 (W.D. La. 1982).
271. Id. at 269-70.
272. Id. at 266-67. The factors looked at by the court in Lewis were stated as follows: "(1)
whether the defendant was prejudiced as a result of the cx parte autopsy; (2) whether the prejudice
can be cured; (3) the practical importance of the evidence; (4) whether the plaintiff was in good or
bad faith; and (5) the potential for abuse if the evidence is not excluded."
273. 796 F. Supp. 966 (W.D. La. 1992).
274. Id. at 969-71.
275. See supra notes 185-187 and accompanying text.
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At the time Edwards was decided, there was no Louisiana jurisprudence on
this issue; therefore, the court looked to common law cases as well as policy
considerations. The court concluded: "it is not necessary for this court to
determine whether the Louisiana Supreme Court would recognize a claim for
spoliation of evidence under any circumstances. This court concludes that
[plaintiff's] claim would not be recognized under the circumstances of this
case." 276 Thus, no spoliation-of-evidence claim was recognized under the facts
of Edwards, although the court implied Louisiana may recognize spoliation of
evidence as a separate tort under different circumstances. 2"
Shortly after the decision in Edwards, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeal was faced with the issue of spoliation of evidence in Williams v. General
Motors Corp. (Williams 1).27 The underlying lawsuit in Williams I was a
products liability claim against an automobile manufacturer. The manufacturer,
General Motors, later brought a spoliation-of-evidence claim against the
plaintiff's attorney for failure to preserve the automobile.
The facts in Williams I reveal the automobile was repaired and, thereafter,
the alleged defective parts were stored at the repair shop for more than two years
before they were "inadvertently lost." '279 The court held that the plaintiff's
attorney did not have a duty to preserve the evidence since the evidence was not
in his custody at the time of the spoliation.8 The court, therefore, affirmed
the granting of the third-party defendant's motion for summary judgment and
exception of no cause of action.
General Motors also brought a spoliation-of-evidence claim against
Prudential, the automobile insurance company. General Motors contended that
the automobile insurance company owed a duty to preserve the photographs of
the parts of the vehicle.' On that issue, the court stated that even if a duty
to preserve such photographs existed, there was an alternative piece of evidence
available; i.e., photocopies of the photographs. Therefore, General Motors was
not prejudiced by the destruction of the photographs.28 ' The granting of
Prudential's exception of no cause of action was affirmed.
It should be noted that, although Williams I technically involved negligent
spoliation of evidence, the court never used that term in-its decision, and none
of the parties involved ever cited any spoliation-of-evidence cases as authori-
ty.2"3 However, the approach taken by the court in Williams I is consistent
with the approach taken by other courts which held that where there is no duty
276. Edwards, 796 F. Supp. at 971-72.
277. Id.
278. 607 So. 2d 695 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992).
279. Id. at 696.
280. Id. at 697.
281. Jd. at 696.
282. Id. at 698.
283. General Motors did convey to the court that other jurisdictions had recognized "a cause of
action for the wrongful disposition of evidence." Id. at 697 (emphasis added).
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to preserve the evidence, there is no negligence. What is disputable in Williams
I is the court's statement that the third-party defendant (plaintiff's attorney) had
no duty to preserve the evidence." 4 General Motors argued the attorney had
a duty because he instructed the repairman on how to store the evidence.S'
If such an instruction was given, then the attorney arguably did have a duty to
preserve the evidence either as a result of his relationship or his assumption of
a duty to preserve the evidence through a third-party repairman. The court,
however, held no material issue of fact existed as to whether the attorney
instructed the repairman, and thus affirmed the granting of a summary judgment
since no duty existed under the facts of the case.2"'
In Kammerer v. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans, the Louisiana
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal finally analyzed a case as a "spoliation of
evidcnce" cause of action." 7 The plaintiff in Kammerer brought a claim
against the defendant for damages resulting from an automobile collision with
a manhole cover. In addition to alleging a defect in the manhole cover, the
plaintiff sought a remedy for the defendant's destruction of the manhole cover.
The injured party argued that the court should apply the evidentiary spoliation
doctrine; i.e, an adverse presumption against the spoliator.28' The court
summarily rejected the plaintiff's arguments by holding that "[the doctrine of
spoliation is not applicable in the instant case because there was no intentional
destruction of evidence for the purpose of depriving the plaintiff of its use."',
The court further stated that the defendant had no notice of the potential or
pending litigation involving the manhole cover, and thus had no foreseeability
of the harm caused by the destruction of evidence.2'
The majority opinion is concise, with little elaboration. On the other hand,
the two concurring opinions, which although are only dicta, reveal much about
the court's reasoning. Judge Jones, in his concurring opinion, sided with the
majority based on the court finding that the plaintiff could not have won his
underlying lawsuit, and thus suffered no prejudicial injury as a result of the
spoliation of the evidence.29 The plaintiff's expert opined he would have had
to examine the manhole cover shortly after the collision to determine any defect
in the metal. Judge Jones in his concurrence thus concluded that since the
plaintiff did not file his lawsuit until one year after the accident, the plaintiff's
284. Id. at 697.
285. Id. at 698.
286. Id.
287. 633 So. 2d 1357 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 639 So. 2d 1163 (1994). In particular,
see Judge Waltzer's concurring opinion.
288. Id. at 1357-58.
289. Id. at 1358 (emphasis added).
290. Id. But see the dissenting opinion which states "the custodian of any type of evidence
which is obviously or potentially relevant to a pending or possible litigation should be burdened with
the responsibility of preserving that evidence." Id. at 1368.
291. Id. at 1359.
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expert would not have been able to make a determination of defect even had the
defendant preserved the evidence. 92
Judge Waltzer's concurring opinion discussed the history of evidentiary
spoliation doctrine in detail, but skirted around any discussion of spoliation of
evidence as a separate tort. His analysis of the adverse presumption doctrine in
Louisiana accurately stated the rule that a presumption will be applied against a
party who destroys evidence unless a reasonable explanation is given. Thus, in
Louisiana, it is a rebuttable presumption against the spoliator. In Kammerer, the
defendant overcame the presumption, according to Judge Waltzer, when it
explained that the manhole cover was destroyed as part of a routine destruc-
tion. 93 The concurring opinion also reasoned the "information contained in
the destroyed evidence was available through alternative evidence discoverable
to the plaintiff."29'
While the majority opinion in Kammerer does not discuss the recognition of
spoliation of evidence as a separate tort, the concurring opinion does analyze this
issue. Judge Waltzer in his concurring opinion stated that Louisiana does not
"pigeon hole" delictual concepts; rather, Louisiana "defines our concept of tort
as one of civil wrong." '  He further stated that "Louisiana's civil law
recognizes [plaintiff's] interest in preservation of the SWB's manhole cover
under the related concepts of access to the courts and the litigant's right to prove
the elements of his claim." '296 However, Judge Waltzer found that the "destruc-
tion of the manhole cover [was], under the facts of this case, irrelevant to the
ultimate resolution of the issue of SWB's liability, and has not eliminated
[plaintiff's] 'right to prove' his case."'297
The dissenting opinion in Kammerer criticized the majority for holding that
the adverse presumption did not apply because there was no intentional
destruction of the evidence. As pointed out by Judge Plotkin in his dissenting
opinion, the majority's reliance on Williams v. General Motors Corp. (Williams
299 rror W.,...29no1)'" was in error99 Williams I does not hold that an intentional destruction
is required for the adverse presumption to apply. Such a proposition was only
mentioned in the concurring opinion of Williams L3° Thus, the court in
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1365.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1362.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 1366. Judge Waltzer reasoned that the plaintiff could still prove the defendant had
actual or constructive knowledge of the defect through other available evidence. See also Salone v.
Jefferson Parish Dept. of Water, 645 So. 2d 747 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1994) (holding that even though
adverse presumption was applicable, plaintiff still had to prove actual or constructive knowledge, on
the part of the defendant, of the defect in the manhole cover).
298. 607 So. 2d 695 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992).
299. Kammerer, 633 So. 2d at 1367.




Kammerer should have allowed the adverse presumption for the destruction of
the evidence even if done negligently rather than intentionally. Of course, the
presumption may have been inapplicable had the court found the routine
destruction a reasonable explanation. Such an explanation, however, was
criticized by both Judge Jones in his concurring opinion 30' and by the dissent-
ing opinion." 2
The next case to come along is Randolph v. General Motors Corp.303 in
which a parish employee was injured due to a defective part on a dragline
manufactured by General Motors. The trial court in a JNOV assessed fifty
percent liability to the parish on the basis of spoliation of evidence because the
parish threw away the original defective part. Finding that there was no
"intentional destruction of the evidence by the Parish for the purpose of
depriving opposing parties of its use," the First Circuit Court of Appeal reversed
the trial court's imposition of liability on the parish under the theory of
spoliation of evidence.'" The court found the parish gave a sufficient explana-
tion for destruction of the evidence despite the parish's inability to explain
exactly why the defective part was discarded. The appellate court disagreed with
the lower court's finding of foreseeability of a lawsuit, but did not reverse on the
basis of no duty on the part of the spoliator. And finally, the court noted that
the discarded part did not prevent the experts from rendering an.opinion as to the
most probable cause of the accident."' That is, plaintiff suffered no prejudicial
injury as the result of the spoliation of the evidence.
The court in Carter v. Exide Corp. was faced with the specific issue of
whether an employer has a duty to preserve evidence for a third-party lawsuit
and, if so, the extent to which an employer may be liable under Louisiana
law.3" A mechanic who was injured on the job while repairing an automobile
battery brought a claim against his employer for failure to preserve the battery,
a vital piece of evidence in his claim against the owner of the vehicle. After
determining that the workers' compensation immunity did not bar the employee
from bringing a claim against the employer for post-accident destruction of
evidence,307 the court in Exide looked at the issue of whether the employer had
a duty to preserve the evidence. The court stated that the duty must arise from
301. Kammerer, 633 So. 2d at 1359 (stating that a "professional defendant . . . cannot with
impunity continue a policy of recognizing that property may be involved in litigation, and then
maintain the policy of immediately destroying that property.").
302. Id. at 1368 (stating that allowing such an explanation to overcome the presumption
"provides a disincentive to the defendant to preserve important evidence and thereby should not be
sanctioned because it is against public policy.").
303. 646 So. 2d 1019 (La. App. I st Cir. 1994).
304. Id. at 1027 (citing Kammerer). But see criticisms of that part of the decision in Kammerer,
supra notes 298-300 and accompanying text.
305. Id.
306. 661 So. 2d 698 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995).
307. Id. at 704. This decision is consistent with other states addressing this issue. See supra
notes 189, 221 and accompanying text.
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"a statute, a contract, a special relationship between the parties, or an affirmative
agreement or undertaking to preserve the evidence." The court further stated that
plaintiff must specifically plead such a duty and "require[d] a showing of
something more than the general tort duty to act reasonably under the circum-
stances.""' Without a specific duty and breach of that duty alleged, the court
refused to recognize a cause of action for spoliation of evidence. The plaintiff
was allowed to amend his petition for damages to plead particular allegations of
the source of employer's duty to preserve evidence.
The reasoning of Carter was rejected by the Louisiana Third Circuit Court
of Appeal in Bethea v. Modern Biomedical Services, Inc.3"9 Defendant filed
an exception of no cause of action after plaintiff alleged an impairment-of-a-
civil-action claim as well as negligent and intentional spoliation of evidence.
The court in Bethea analyzed the claim under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315,
noting that fault under Article 2315 is to be broadly interpreted. ' Even
though no statutory duty existed, the court held "a duty exists under La. Civ.
Code art. 2315. The absence of a statutory duty is. not tantamount to no
duty.".3.  At least in the third circuit, impairment of a civil claim and spolia-
tion of evidence are viable causes of action in Louisiana under general tort
precepts.
With the third circuit in Bethea acknowledging a viable cause of action
under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315, along with the concurring opinion of
the fourth circuit in Kammerer, perhaps the path has been laid for recognition of
spoliation of evidence as a separate tort under Louisiana. We must await the
next case to see what action the Louisiana courts will take with this new cause
of action and how the Louisiana Supreme Court will decide its fate.
C. Procedural Factors
1. Prescription
Whether a cause of action for spoliation of evidence has prescribed is an
essential concern to all involved in a spoliation-of-evidence claim. In Louisiana,
most claims must be asserted within one year of the injury.'1 2  Louisiana
allows an extended period of time to file suit if the circumstances fall under one
of the factors listed for contra non valentum.3"' Commonly known as the
308. Id. at 705. This decision is in line of jurisprudence across the country. See supra notes
185, 265 and accompanying text.
309. No. 97-332, 1997 WL 728565, *6 (La. App. 3d Cir. Nov. 19, 1997) (unpublished opinion).
310. Id. at *10. See also White v. Montsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 1205 (La. 1991) (stating that fault
principles under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 are broad, and recognizing intentional infliction
of emotional distress as a viable cause of action in Louisiana).
311. Bethea, 1997 WL 728565, at *Il (unpublished opinion).
312. La. Civ. Code art. 3492.
313. See Corsey v. Department of Corrections, 375 So. 2d 1319 (La. 1979).
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discovery rule, contra non valentum prevents the prescription period from
running until the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered, the cause of
action. Since spoliation of evidence is often difficult to discover, contra non
valentum should extend the prescriptive periods of those cases where the plaintiff
reasonably did not discover the cause of. action until after the one-year
prescriptive period had expired." 4
The only Louisiana court faced with prescription as an issue in a spoliation-
of-evidence case is the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal in Bethea.31
During the course of discovery, information revealed the failure of the defendant
to preserve critical evidence. Thereafter, plaintiff filed amended and supplemen-
tal petitions which were the subject of an exception of prescription filed by
defendant. Although contra non valentum was not addressed in Bethea, the court
found the spoliation-of-evidence claim and impairment-of-a-civil-claim action
factually related back to the original cause of action. Reversing the trial court,
the appellate court held the claim was not prescribed.3 6
2. Burden of Proof and Suit-Within-the-Suit Requirement
As previously discussed, common law states are divided on whether the
spoliation-of-evidence cause of action can only be brought after the resolution
of the underlying lawsuit. Some courts have held the prejudicial injury does not
occur until after the injured party receives an unfavorable resolution of the
original claim."t ' Others have allowed the spoliation-of-evidence cause of
action to be litigated alongside the underlying claim.3' 8 However, most courts
have held that when a legal malpractice action is involved, the plaintiff must first
prove that he would have won the underlying lawsuit to show any prejudicial
injury as a result of the legal malpractice." 9 This has been termed the "suit
within the suit" requirement.
After years of following the suit-within-the-suit requirement, the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Jenkins v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. modified that
theory for legal malpractice cases.32° The Court in Jenkins held that plaintiff
proves his prima facie case upon showing that the former attorney agreed to
handle the case and failed to timely file the claim. The burden then shifts to the
314. See, e.g., Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986) (affirming the
lower court's application of the discovery rule to the facts of the case). In Hazen, the court stated
that under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until "the aggrieved party
discovered or reasonably should have discovered the facts that gave that party a cause of action."
The court concluded that the difficulty the plaintiff had in discovering the alteration of the tape
"warranted giving the discovery rule .. " Id. at 464-65. See also supra note 225.
315. No. 97-332, 1997 WL 728565 (La. App. 3d Cir. Nov. 19, 1997) (unpublished opinion).
316. Id. at *9.
317. See supra notes 85, 139, 153 and accompanying text.
318. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
320. 422 So. 2d 1109 (La. 1982).
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former attorney to overcome plaintiff's prima facie case by proving that the
plaintiff would not have won the original claim. Thus, in Louisiana there is no
requirement that the plaintiff must first show the spoliated evidence would have
allowed the plaintiff to successfully prove the underlying lawsuit when bringing
a cause of action against his attorney for spoliation of evidence. The same
argument can be made under Louisiana law no matter who is the spoliator.
Modification of the suit-within-the-suit requirement in Louisiana cases eases the
opposing party's burden in proving damages as the result of the spoliation of
evidence. To require otherwise would reward the spoliator for his conduct.
Another procedural issue in this developing area of law is determining the
applicable burden of proof in a spoliation-of-evidence claim. Although no
Louisiana court has addressed this issue, the burden of proof for a spoliation
claim should be analogous to that required in an impairment-of-a-civil-claim
action. That is, the plaintiff must prove "the loss of plaintiff's opportunity to
pursue the claim. 32
1
D. Other Sanctions Available Under Louisiana Law
1. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, State Rules of Civil Procedure, and
the Court's Inherent Powers Doctrine
As previously discussed, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37 can be an
effective remedy for spoliation of evidence where there is a violation of a court
order.12 In cases where there is no violation of a court order, the court has
broad discretionary power to impose sanctions under the court's inherent powers
doctrine."'
One Louisiana case that applied federal discovery sanctions was Lewis v.
Darce Towing Co.324 In Lewis, the court stated that it had broad discretion to
impose discovery sanctions under Rule 26 and the court's inherent powers
doctrine.3 2' Exclusion of plaintiff's expert's testimony was held an appropriate
sanction under the facts.326 The court looked at the following five factors in
determining whether the evidence should be excluded: "(1) whether the
defendant was prejudiced as a result of the ex parte autopsy; (2) whether the
prejudice can be cured; (3) the practical importance of the evidence; (4) whether
321. Duhe v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 1414, 1416 (E.D. La. 1986); Williams v.
General Motors Corp., 607 So. 2d 695, 697 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992); Fischer v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
429 So. 2d 538, 540 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).
322. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
323. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
324. 94 F.R.D. 262 (W.D. La. 1982).
325. Id. at 265-66.
326. Id. at 272. See also Williams v. General Motors Corp. (Williams 11), 639 So. 2d 275, 290
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1994) (on opinion for grant of rehearing stating that the failure to produce the
evidence "reflects on the quality of the expert testimony." The court under the facts of the case
found plaintiff's expert's testimony inadmissible.).
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the plaintiff was in good or bad faith; and (5) the potential for abuse if the
evidence is not excluded.,
327
State rules of civil procedure also provide sanctions. Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure article 1471 is the comparable state rule to federal Rule 37.32
In addition, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 191 provides the state
courts with inherent powers to impose appropriate sanctions.329
2. Criminal Code
Louisiana's Criminal Code may also provide some remedy when evidence
is spoliated. One criminal statute that may be applicable is Louisiana Revised
Statutes 14:130.1, which prohibits obstruction of justice.'30  Louisiana's
327. Lewis v. Daree Towing Co., 94 F.R.D. 262, 266-67 (W.D. La. 1982).
328. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1471 provides:
If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated
under Articles 1442 or 1448 to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to
provide or permit discovery, including an order made under Article 1469 or Article 1464,
the court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as
are just, and among others the following:
(1) An order that the matters regarding w]hich the order was made or any other
designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in
accordsnce with the claim of the party obtaining the order.
(2) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated
claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence.
(3) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until
the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or
rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party.
(4) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order treating as a
contempt of court the failure to obey any orders except an order to submit to a physical
or mental examination.
(5) Where a party has failed to comply with an order under Article 1464, requiring him
to produce another for examination, such orders as are listed in Paragraphs (1), (2), and
(3) of this Article, unless the party failing to comply shows that he is unable to produce
such a person for examination.
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court shall require the
party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising him or both to pay the reasonable
expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the
failure was substantially justified or that the other circumstances make an award of
expenses unjust.
329. La. Code Civ. P. art. 191 provides: "A court possesses inherently all of the power
necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction even though not granted expressly by law."
330. The relevant part of La. R.S. 14:130.1 (1986) provides:
A. The crime of obstruction of justice is any of the following when committed with the
knowledge that such act has, reasonably may, or will affect an actual or potential present,
past, or future criminal proceeding as hereinafter described:
(1) Tampering with evidence with the specific intent of distorting the results of any
criminal investigation or proceeding which may reasonably prove relevant to a criminal
investigation or proceeding. Tampering with evidence shall include the intentional
alteration, movement, removal, or addition to any object or substance .... (emphasis
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obstruction-of-justice statute, however, is limited in its applicabilityto spoliation-
of-evidence claims because it only applies to a "criminal investigation or
proceeding." '' The plaintiff in one Louisiana case argued that spoliation of
evidence "constitutes an obstruction of justice." '332 The court in Williams I,
however, did not comment on that argument.
3. Code of Professional Responsibility
The Louisiana Supreme Court adopted Code of Professional Responsibility
Rule 3.4 for attorneys in 1987."'5 Rule 3.4A provides for sanctions where an
attorney obstructs an opposing party's access to evidence. This may provide an
effective deterrent to attorneys from spoliating evidence or advising their clients
to do so.
E. Recognition of Other New Torts in Louisiana
Louisiana courts have shown a willingness to adopt new torts when
necessary. Louisiana adopted "intentional interference with a business contract"
in 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, which went against a long line of jurispru-
dence failing to recognize this cause of action.'
Louisiana also recognized negligent infliction of emotional distress in
Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital.?35 Again, the court rejected prior Louisiana
jurisprudence and allowed this new cause of action to exist despite the lack of
any physical injury. Shortly thereafter, negligent infliction of emotional distress
was legislatively adopted in Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.6.
added).
331. Id.
332. Williams v. General Motors Corp. (Williams 1), 607 So. 2d 695, 697 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1992)
333. Rule 3.4 provides in part:
A lawyer shall not:
(a) Unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy
or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer
shall not counsel or assist another person to do such an act;
(b) Falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement
to a witness that is prohibited by law;
(d) In pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make reasonably
diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party;
and
(f) Request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant
information to another party unless:
(I) The person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a client, and
(2) The lawyer reasonably believes that the person's interests will not be adversely
affected by refraining from giving such information.
334. 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989).
335. 556 So. 2d 559 (La. 1990).
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Within a year of Lejeune, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in White v.
Monsanto Co., held that intentional infliction of emotional distress is a viable
cause of action in Louisiana.3 The court based its recognition of this cause
of action on Louisiana Civil Code "article 2315 and duty-risk principles."37
The court analyzed the claim for intentional infliction of emotion distress under
general tort precepts similar to what the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal
did in Bethea when it discussed the recognition of spoliation of evidence as a
cause of action." 8 Article 2315 is the cornerstone for recognition of spoliation
of evidence, as well as other new torts, in Louisiana.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, prior to 1997 the only remedy Louisiana courts have granted
for spoliation-of-evidence claims has been the application of an evidentiary
spoliation doctrine (i.e., adverse presumption). The adverse presumption is
rebuttable and has been easily overcome by a "reasonable" explanation.
However, a federal district court in Edwards v. Louisville Ladder Co. inferred
that Louisiana may recognize spoliation of evidence as a separate tort if the right
facts were presented. 39 In Bethea v. Modern Biomedical Services, Inc., the
third circuit recognized the cause of action under Louisiana Civil Code article
2315, the general article which governs delictual torts. If the Louisiana Supreme
Court were to recognize a new tort for the spoliation of evidence, the factors
examined by the common law jurisprudence... would serve as a guide in
determining when a separate tort should be recognized under the facts of each
case. As additional guidance, the court can look to such cases as Solano v.
Delancy34 for the elements required for an intentional-spoliation-of-evidence
claim, and Continental Insurance Co. v. Herman34' for the elements required
for a negligent-spoliation-of-evidence claim.
If, however, Louisiana refused to recognize the cause of action as a separate
tort, the courts should shift the burden of proof onto the intentional spoliator.
Shifting the burden of proof would allow the plaintiff to prove his prima facie
case once it is shown that the evidence was intentionally destroyed. Such a
shifting of the burden of proof would be a harsher consequence on an intentional
spoliator than a mere rebuttable presumption. The jurisprudence of other states
336. 585 So. 2d 1205 (La. 1991).
337. Id. at 1209.
338. See supra notes 309-311 and accompanying text.
339. 796 F. Supp. 966, 971-72 (W.D. La. 1992).
340. The factors include: (1) intentional versus negligent spoliation; (2) duty to preserve the
evidence; (3) availability of alternative remedies; (4) prejudicial injury; and (5) spoliation by a party
to the original lawsuit versus by a third party.
341. 264 Cal. Rptr. 721, 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). See also supra note 63 and accompanying
text.
342. 576 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). See also supra note 79 and accompanying
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allowing such a conclusive presumption of liability would serve as a guide for
the Louisiana courts.3 '
Several specific Louisiana statutes create a duty to preserve evidence. In
particular, Louisiana has a statute that requires the retention of medical records,
thus imposing a statutory duty to preserve the records.4 Since spoliation of
evidence occurs frequently in medical malpractice actions, the legislature should
specifically remedy such spoliation of evidence by enacting sanctions for breach
of that duty.
Discovery sanctions, such as those utilized by the court in Lewis,"'5 or
sanctions imposed under the court's inherent power, is an alternative remedy to
the recognition of a new tort. The sanctions range from exclusion of expert
testimony to dismissal or summary judgment. A concern with applying those
sanctions is the broad discretion a judge has in determining the severity of the
sanction. There must be a consistent application of the sanctions in order for
them to act as an effective deterrent. One way to accomplish this would be the
enactment of a new statute in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure which
would provide for explicit sanctions.
Currently, the rebuttable adverse inference does not adequately deter
spoliation of evidence. Besides such an adverse inference, the court has several
options available to remedy a spoliation-of-evidence claim. It can recognize the
cause of action as a separate new tort in Louisiana. Alternatively, it can shift the
burden of proof or impose sanctions. Finally, our legislature can enact specific
remedies for statutorily-created duties to preserve evidence.
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 encompasses the fault-based tort of
spoliation of evidence. For authority, see White v. Monsanto Co. in which the
Louisiana Supreme Court broadly construed article 2315 and recognized the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress.'46 Louisiana is in line with the
majority of the rest of the country in its slow recognition of spoliation of
evidence as a separate tort. However, with the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of
Appeal's decision in Bethea,"'7 more Louisiana courts may be willing to
analyze spoliation of evidence as a cause of action under the general tort
precepts. It is time for Louisiana to take a firm stand against the destruction or
alteration of evidence. Recognition of a spoliation-of-evidence claim as a viable
cause of action is the most effective method to do so.
343. See supra notes 34, 51, 75, 92, 173, 174, 197 and accompanying text.
344. La. R.S. 40:1299.96 (__J. See also La. R.S. 33:1562 (1988) (imposing a duty on health-
care providers to preserve evidence surrounding deaths which are sudden, accidental, violent or which
occur under suspicious circumstances.).
345. 94 F.R.D. 262 (W.D. La. 1982).
346. White v. Monsanto, 585 So. 2d 1205 (La. 1991).
347. Bethea, No. 97-332, 1997 WL 728565 (La. App. 3d Cir. Nov. 19, 1997) (unpublished
opinion).
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